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Heterogeneity in Convergence Rates and 
Income Determination across U.S. States: 





We utilize county-level data to explore growth determination in the U.S. and possible 
heterogeneity in growth determination across individual states.  The data includes over 
3,000 cross-sectional observations and 39 demographic control variables.  We use a 
consistent two stage least squares estimation procedure.  (We report OLS estimates as 
well.)  The estimated convergence rate across the U.S. is about 7 percent per year – 
higher than the 2 percent normally found with OLS in cross-country, U.S. state, and 
European region samples.  Estimated convergence rates for 32 individual states are above 
2 percent with an average of 8.1 percent.  For 29 states the convergence rate is above 2 
percent with 95 percent confidence.  For seven states the convergence rate can be rejected 
as identical to at least one other state’s convergence rate with 95 percent confidence.  In 
examining the determinants of balanced growth path heights, we find that government at 
all levels of decentralization is negatively correlated with economic growth.  Educational 
attainment of a population has a non-linear relationship with economic growth according 
to our estimates: growth is positively related to high-school degree attainment, seemingly 
unrelated to obtaining some college education, and then positively related to four-year 
degree or more attainment.  Also, finance, insurance and real estate industry and 
entertainment industry are positively correlated with growth, while education industry is 
negatively correlated with growth.  Heterogeneity in the effects of balanced growth path 
determinants across individual states is much harder to detect (or dismiss) than in 
convergence rates. 
   3
1.   Introduction 
 “ Economies converge at a speed of about two percent per year.”  This is what 
Sala-i-Martin (1996, p. 1326) put forth as a “mnemonic rule” of economic growth 
empirics.  He was referring to how quickly an economy will converge to its individual 
balanced growth path for per capita income.  Results in line with this rule were first 
reported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
1  
Sala-i-Martin declared two percent a mnemonic rule because the result is found whether a 
researcher considers samples of countries, U.S. states, or European regions.  
However, when any of these samples are used in growth regressions, researchers 
are implicitly imposing the assumption that all economies have identical growth 
processes and, therefore, it is meaningful to estimate a single rate of convergence.  Evans 
(1998) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) have emphasized that this assumption is not 
plausible for most data sets.  For example, Evans has noted that, “countries must surely 
have different technologies, preferences, institutions, market structures, government 
policies, and so forth”(p.296).  These can represent important structural differences.  
The primary contribution of this paper is the use of data from 3,058 counties 
representing the entire U.S. economy to examine heterogeneity in growth processes and 
convergence rates.  This data includes per capita income and 39 demographic variables.  
The inclusion of these variables in the growth regressions is useful for assessing the 
empirical relevance of various determinants of balanced growth path positions.  Using 
this data we are able to estimate parameters not only for the U.S., but also for 32 U.S. 
states as economies in and of themselves.
2  The many degrees of freedom allow us to 
identify state-specific convergence and balanced growth path parameters.  State by state 
analysis admits heterogeneity in (i) convergence rates, (ii) balanced growth path affects, 
and (iii) balanced growth rates (the rate of exogenous technical progress).  The 
heterogeneity (or homogeneity) of the within-state growth processes is explored along 
dimensions (i) and (ii) in this paper.         
                                                 
1 Quah (1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) surveyed some of the literature that followed these seminal studies 
and explored possible explanations to the uniform 2% convergence findings. For a more recent survey, see 
Brock and Durlauf (2001). 
2 The remaining states did not have enough counties for growth equations to be identified.   4
Evidence of heterogeneity in the structure of growth processes has been reported 
previously by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997).  Durlauf 
and Johnson (1995) examined data from 121 countries and rejected the single linear 
growth model in favor of a multiple regime alternative using regression tree analysis.  
Lee et al (1997) showed that deriving a growth equation from an explicitly stochastic 
Solow (1956) model reveals heterogeneity of balanced growth rates as a source of bias in 
convergence rate estimates.
3  Using a panel of 102 countries they found that 
heterogeneity produces an economically significant downward bias in convergence rate 
estimates. 
Heterogeneity in growth processes has also been the focus of a literature 
examining the so-called “club convergence” hypothesis that nations are segregated into 
“clubs” according to important structural similarities and similar initial conditions.  
Convergence occurs within these clubs only.  This hypothesis was borne of Quah’s 
(1996, 1997) identification of an “emerging twin peaks” in the cross-sectional 
distribution of per capita incomes of 105 countries.  Desdoigts (1999) used a non-
parametric technique called exploratory projection pursuit (EPP) to determine which of a 
large number of economic variables cause clustering of economies into clubs.  He found 
that, “[i]nstitutional (OECD versus non-OECD), cultural (Protestant versus Catholic), and 
geographical (continental) clubs of economies form endogenously on the basis of their 
economic structure”(p.323).  The initial stocks of human capital, per capita income and 
technology were identified as the primary determinants of the emergent structure.  Using 
a Bayesian variant of break point analysis, Canova (1999) also found evidence that initial 
conditions lead to clubs.
4    
The above studies of heterogeneity in growth processes are important 
contributions which this paper builds upon.  Durlauf and Johnson’s (1995) analysis was 
non-parametric and identified subsets of countries appearing to have markedly different 
production functions in the sense that “more developed countries have higher output-
labour ratios than implied by their capital-labour ratios alone”(p.366).  They concluded 
                                                 
3 The standard growth equation is derived from the deterministic Solow model, and then an error term is 
appended ad hoc. 
4 Canova’s (1999) analysis, being Bayesian, posited that the structural parameters of economies in a given 
club are not identical, but rather that they have the same distribution.  Canova notes that, therefore, in 
principle his analysis allowed for structural heterogeneity intra-clubs as well as inter-clubs.    5
that “the explanatory power of the Solow model may be enhanced with a theory of 
aggregate production function differences”, but did not identify the determinants of the 
structural differences.  Desdoigts’ (1999) approach, similarly, identified differences in the 
average values of certain economic variables across the discovered clubs without 
identifying the determinants of the differences.   Canova (1999) also identified clubs 
according to initial income and human capital levels, but not the determinants of the 
clubs.  Lee et al’s (1997) regressions only covered 1965-1989 so that the degrees of 
freedom needed to identify the important causes of structural differences were not 
available.
5   
The existing studies represent a range of ingenious techniques designed to cope 
with a limited amount of available observations (in terms of both cross-sectional units 
and time periods) to make meaningful statements concerning growth process 
heterogeneity.  These papers primarily departed from the convergence literature, typified 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) and Mankiw et al (1992), by innovating along 
the lines of econometric specification.  The present paper uses new data as its primary 
innovation.   
Besides the large amount of observations and conditioning variables, the county-
level data offer numerous advantages in identifying growth processes.   A single 
institution collects the data, ensuring considerable uniformity of variable definitions.  
There is no exchange rate variation between the counties and the price variation across 
counties is smaller than across countries.  Also, U.S. counties are characterized by 
exceptional mobility of resources and factors.
6  Importantly, counties within a given state 
represent a sample with geographical homogeneity and a shared state government.  To a 
great extent the states are ready-made “clubs” within which (if anywhere) we would 
expect convergence to occur.  High degrees of freedom allow us to study inter-state 
heterogeneity, while the intra-state homogeneity gives as much assurance of a correct 
specification as can realistically be hoped for.  Lastly of note is the relative homogeneity 
of U.S. counties as a whole.  If we find economically important heterogeneity of growth 
                                                 
5 Country-specific intercepts were evoked to control for all differences in balanced growth paths. 
6 Many of these virtues are, of course, embodied in state-level data used by, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) and Evans (1997a).  However, state-level data sacrifices the large number of observations that we 
have.  A full 29 of our states have counties numbering more than 50 (the number of U.S. states) each.   6
processes across states, then surely we can infer that as much, or (more likely) more, 
heterogeneity exists across countries. 
Although we primarily address the question of heterogeneity with richer data, we 
also utilize a cross-sectional variant of a two stage least squares (2SLS) approach 
suggested recently by Evans (1997a, 1997b) for estimating growth equations.  Evans 
(1997b) demonstrated that data must satisfy highly implausible conditions for ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimators to be consistent.  He proposed a 2SLS method that 
produces consistent estimators.  He applied the method to a sample of 85 countries and 
reported convergence rates of between 8 and 9 percent.  Evans (1997a) then adapted the 
method to panel data and studied both international data and state-level data from the 
U.S.  He estimated rates of convergence of about 6 percent across countries and 16 
percent across the U.S.  If the bias of  OLS estimates has caused underestimation of the 
speed of convergence, then this has important implications for how we view the plight of 
laggard economies.  E.g., a convergence rate of 2 percent means that economies close the 
gap between their current position and their balanced growth path in approximately 34 
years.  However, if the actual convergence rate is 6 percent then the gap is closed in 11 
years; if it is 16 percent the gap will be closed in 4 years.  In Higgins, Levy and Young 
(2003) we showed that, for the entire U.S., the 2SLS procedure yielded a convergence 
rate estimate of just under 7 percent, while OLS yielded an estimate of just above 2 
percent (the Sala-i-Martin (1996) mnemonic rule).
7  Here, as well as in the earlier paper, 
we report both 2SLS and conventional OLS estimates. 
We find significant heterogeneity across within-state convergence rates.  Across 
the 32 states for which we report results, 2SLS point estimates range from 3.8 percent 
(California) to 15.6 percent (Louisiana).  The 95 percent confidence intervals associated 
with these estimates are precise enough so that the heterogeneity cannot be dismissed on 
grounds of uncertainty.  Interestingly, using the consistent 2SLS estimation every intra-
state convergence rate estimate is above the 2 percent mnemonic rule.  Moreover, even 
the lower bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals only fall below 2 percent in 3 cases: 
California, Iowa and North Dakota (all 1.8 percent).  Despite finding significant 
                                                 
7 In Higgins et al (2003) we reported estimates for metro and non-metro county sub-samples, and for five 
regional sub-samples, and found significant heterogeneity across those cases.   7
heterogeneity in convergence rates, we also find the vast majority to be homogenous in 
that they are higher than the mnemonic rule.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the econometric 
specification of the neoclassical growth regression and the 2SLS technique we employ.  
Section 3 decribes the county-level data.  Section 4 explores heterogeneity in the 
conditional convergence rates, and a similar exploration of the findings regarding 
balanced growth path determinants is in section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Econometric Model and 2SLS Estimation Procedure 
  The basic specification used here and in other cross-sectional growth regressions 
arises from the neoclassical growth model of Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan 
(1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965).
8  The growth model implies that, 
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where  y ˆ  is log of income per effective unit of labor (technology assumed to be labor 
augmenting), t is the time period (0 being the initial time period), and B is a nonlinear 
function of the economy’s discount (average, subjective), population growth, and 
technological growth rates, as well as preference parameters.  B governs the speed of 
adjustment to the steady state.  The 
* ˆ y  is the economy’s steady-state log level of income 
per effective unit of labor.  From (2.1) it follows that the average growth rate of income 
per unit of labor between dates 0 and T is, 
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where z is the exogenous rate of technical progress and B represents the responsiveness of 
the average growth rate to the gap between the steady state of log income per effective 
unit of labor and the initial value.  Since effective units of labor (L) are assumed to equal 
Le
zt, we have  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ˆ y y = . 
                                                 
8 A derivation of the baseline specification from the growth model is provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992).   8
From this model, growth regressions are obtained by using OLS to fit cross-
sectional data on economies 1,…, N to the equation, 
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In (2.3),  n g  is the average growth rate of per capita income for economy n between years 














,  n x  
is a vector of variables that control for cross-economy heterogeneity in determinants of 
the steady-state, 
* ˆ y , γ  is a vector of coefficients on those variables, and ν n is the error 
term assumed to have zero mean and finite variance.   
However, Evans (1997b) showed that OLS estimates will be consistent only when 
the data satisfy highly implausible conditions.  Plausible departures from these conditions 
can produce large biases. Specifically, Evans demonstrated that unless (i) the dynamical 
structures of the economies examined have identical, first-order autoregressive 
representations, (ii) every economy affects every other economy symmetrically, and (iii) 
the set of conditioning variables controls for all permanent cross-economy differences, 
the OLS estimators of the speed of convergence are inconsistent.  They are biased 
downwards, underestimating the speed of convergence. 
Evans (1997b) proposed a 2SLS instrumental variables approach that consistently 
estimates the speed of convergence as well as the effects of conditioning variables.  We 
use a cross-section variant of his method.  The method consists of two stages.  In the first 
stage we use instrumental variables to estimate the equation, 
 









n T n n T n
n
) ( ) ( 1 , 1 , 0 , , − − −
−
−
= ∆ , 
   9
1 , 0 0 − − = ∆ n n n y y y ,  n y  is the logarithm of per capita income for county n, ω  and β  are 
parameters, and  n η  is the error term.  We use the lagged (1969) values of all the 
independent variables as instruments, with the exception of Metro Area, Water Area, and 
Land Area.
9  Given the sample period we use here, we define, 
 









* β  as the estimator obtained from equation (2.4).  In the second 
stage, we take the estimate for 
* β , multiply it by  0 n y  and then subtract the product from 
n g .  This yields a variable, 
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which is then regressed (using OLS) on an intercept and the vector of variables,  n x , that 
are potential influences on balanced growth path levels.  This second-stage regression is 
of the form, 
 
(2.6)   n n n x ε γ τ π + + = ,          
 
where τ  and γ  are parameters and ε n is an error term.  This regression yields a consistent 
estimator, γ
*.  Also note that τ is the same, in principle, as the OLS α.  It is an estimate of 
the exogenous rate of technical progress, z, or the balanced growth rate. 
  What this two stage procedure essentially does is, in the first stage, differences 
out any uncontrolled form of heterogeneity from the specification so that an omitted 
variable bias does not occur
10 and then, in the second stage, uses the resulting estimate of 
                                                 
9 See the data appendix for details. 
10 The derivation of this equation (see Evans (1997b)) depends on the assumption that the conditioning 
variables are (approximately) constant during the time frame considered, allowing them to be differenced 
out.  We are indebted to Nazrul Islam for pointing out that, while this is a reasonable assumption for many 
conditioning variables in the literature (e.g., an index of democracy for an international sample over 15 
years), many of our county-level conditioning variables potentially vary significantly (e.g., the percent of 
the population employed in the communications industry over 28 years).  To make sure that this did not 
introduce significant omitted variable bias into our estimations we ran the three first stage regressions for   10
β  to recreate the component of a standard growth regression that would be related to the 
set of conditioning variables.  This component can then be regressed on a constant and 
the conditioning variables, in “un-differenced” form, to estimate the effects of 
conditioning variables on balanced growth paths.  This procedure ensures that none of the 
information contained in the levels of the conditioning variables is lost.
11   
Besides reporting OLS results below, as well as 2SLS results, for comparison, we 
also use a Hausman test as an additional aid in the determination of the appropriateness 
of the instrumental variable approach for the full U.S. sample.  Two separate tests were 
performed.  The first test was run on the β  values and yielded an m value of 134.6. The 
second test was run on the entire model and yielded an m value of 1236.6.  Indeed, both 
tests reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, thereby suggesting that the OLS estimates 
are inconsistent. 
 
3.  U.S. County-Level Data 
The data for this study were drawn from several different sources.  The majority 
of the data, however, came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic 
Information System (BEA-REIS) and U.S. Census data sets.
12  The BEA-REIS data are 
largely based on the 1970, 1980 and 1990 decennial Census summary tape files, the 
1972, 1977, 1982 and 1987 Census of Governments, the Census Bureau’s City and 
County Book from various years.  All dollar variables are expressed in constant 1992 
prices.  Natural logs were used throughout the project.  We exclude military personnel 
from the measurements of both personal income and population. 
  Our entire data set includes 3,058 county-level observations.
13  We examine the 
full sample, as well as U.S. states as economic units in and of themselves.  We report 
                                                                                                                                                 
the full U.S. sample with differenced values of all conditioning variables included as regressors.  All point 
estimates of β from the modified first stages fell within the 95 percent confidence intervals of the Evans 
method first stage estimates.  As well, if the β estimates are not significantly affected then neither are the 
second stage results (see below).      
11 This is a point on which Barro (1997, p.37) has criticized panel data methods. As they rely on time series 
information, the conditioning variables are differenced.  However, the conditioning variables often vary 
slowly over time such that the most important information is in the levels. 
12 We thank Jordan Rappaport for kindly sharing with us some of the data used in this study. 
13 The original data set contained 3,066 observations.  Eight counties, however, were excluded from the 
data set for various reasons.   Primarily, counties were excluded for lack of data.   Examples of counties 
that fell into this category include counties in northern Alaska and some counties in Hawaii.   Some data for   11
estimation results for 32 of the 50 states.  The standard we used for inclusion was 
whether or not, in the first-stage regressions, the estimate for β was statistically different 
from zero.    
The measure we use for personal income is that of the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).
14  The definitions that are used for the components of personal income 
for the county estimates are essentially the same as those used for U.S. national estimates. 
For example, the BEA defines “personal income” as the sum of wage and salary 
disbursements, other labor income, proprietors’ income (with inventory valuation and 
capital consumption adjustments), rental income (with capital consumption adjustment), 
personal dividend income and personal interest income. (BEA, 1994) “Wage and salary 
disbursements” are measurements of pre-tax income paid to employees.  “Other labor 
income” consists of payments by employers to employee benefit plans.  “Proprietors’ 
income” is divided into two separate components—farm and non-farm.  Per capita 
income for a county is defined as the ratio of this personal income measure for the county 
to the population of the county. We adjust the personal income measure to be net of 
government transfers and express the value in per capita 1992 dollars using the U.S. GDP 
deflator.  Natural logs of the real per capita income measures are used in the analysis.
15 
In addition to the per capita income variable we also utilize 39 demographic 
conditioning variables.   In Table 1 we provide the complete list of the variables we use 
in this study along with their definitions.  In the table we also provide the source of each 
series as well as the period it covers.
16  All 39 of these variables were used for estimation 
using the full sample.  However, only 33 of these were used for the with-in state 
estimations to preserve degrees of freedom.  Our standard for exclusion was that a 
conditioning variable, in the second-stage regression using the full sample, resulted in a 
coefficient estimate with zeros to at least the fourth decimal place (0.0000).  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
these counties were simply not recorded as far back as 1970.   Furthermore, in Virginia, some cities are 
themselves independent counties.   If the data for these independent cities were available we let them stand 
as their own county.   However, if the data were not available, then we tried to incorporate the independent 
city into the surrounding county.   If that was not feasible, it was then dropped from the data set. 
14 The data and their measurement methods are described in detail in “Local Area Personal Income, 1969–
1992” published by the BEA under the Regional Accounts Data, February 2, 2001. 
15 See the Data Appendix at the end of this paper more detailed descriptions of the personal income 
measure. 
16 See the data appendix for the construction/definition of metro and non-metro counties and regions.   12
variables excluded from the within-state regressions were “land area,” “water area,” 
“education: public elementary,” “education: public nursery,” “education: private 
elementary,” and “education: private nursery.” 
 
4.  Analysis of Convergence Rate Estimates 
  The OLS and 2SLS estimates of β , the coefficient on the log of 1970 per capita 
income, are presented in Table 2 for the full U.S. sample and for 32 U.S. states.  The 
speed of conditional convergence can be inferred from β .   Associated with these 
estimates of β, Table 3 reports the asymptotic (conditional) convergence rates and 
associated 95 percent confidence intervals.
17   
  For the full sample of 3,058 counties the 2SLS point estimate of the conditional 
convergence rate is 6.82 percent and is significant at the 1 percent level.  This is 
compared to 2.37 percent using the inconsistent OLS method (also significant at the 1 
percent level).  The OLS 2.37 percent is similar to results reported by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992), Mankiw et al (1992), and Sala-i-Martin (1996).  The difference between 
the OLS and 2SLS estimate is nearly 300 percent.  This suggests that OLS introduces 
substantial bias.  The difference is economically large.  A 2.37 percent convergence rate 
implies the gap between a the present per capita income level and the balanced growth 
path halves in 31 to 32 years, while a 6.82 percent rate implies the same in 12 to 13 years. 
  The basic finding that conditional convergence rates are higher than the 2 percent 
“mnemonic rule” of Sala-i-Martin (1996) holds when examining 32 states as economies 
in and of themselves.  (The remaining states did not include enough county observations 
to be identified.)  Figure 1 presents confidence intervals as vertical bars (that include the 
point estimates).  The 2 percent rule is represented by a horizontal line.  Every point 
estimate is above 2 percent, and the average point estimate is 8.1 percent.  For one fourth 
                                                 
17 Following Evans (1997b, footnote 17, p.16), we use  () T T c
1
1 1 β + − =  to compute the asymptotic rate 
of convergence.  The confidence intervals (in parentheses) are obtained in two steps.  First, we obtain end 
points of the β confidence intervals by computing  () . . 96 . 1 e s × ± β , where s.e. is the standard error 
associated with the β estimate.  Next, these endpoints are plugged into  () T T c
1
1 1 β + − = .  If the low 
value of the confidence interval is less than –T 
-1 , the higher value is equated to unity.  It is clear from the 
above that the confidence intervals computed this way may be asymmetric around the point estimates. As 
Figure 1 indicates, this is indeed the case in our data.   13
(8) of the states the point estimate is above 10 percent.  (A 10 percent convergence rate 
implies that the distance from the balanced growth path is halved within 10 years.)  
Considering the 95 percent confidence intervals, for only 3 states is the lower bound of 
the confidence interval not greater than 2 percent (California, Iowa, and South Dakota all 
bottom out at 1.8 percent).  These results are encouraging for laggard economies in the 
limited sense that, given proper policies/conditions to induce and support balanced 
growth paths similar to industrial leaders, the laggard economies can approach those 
balanced growth paths quickly relative to what previous research has suggested. 
  There is considerable heterogeneity in the estimated convergence rates.  The 
standard deviation of the point estimates is 3.0 percent.  Furthermore, Figure 1 suggests 
that confidence intervals do not overlap enough to dismiss heterogeneity.  The pair wise 
absences of overlap in confidence intervals can be interpreted as statistical rejection of 
convergence rate homogeneity at the 95 percent level for given pairs of states.  We can 
consider a given state and ask for how many other states can its convergence rate be 
rejected as the identical.  For 7 states there is at least one other state for which their two 
convergence rates can be rejected as identical.   
  The full picture that one gets from Table 3 and Figure 1 is a group of economies 
with high rates of convergence relative to the 2 percent suggested by previous OLS-based 
empirics, but significant heterogeneity above that mark.  This heterogeneity should not be 
surprising.  The convergence rate in the neoclassical growth model is a function of the 
technology growth, population growth, and depreciations rates, as well as the parameters 
of the aggregate technology and the representative preferences on time and 
consumption.
18  So differences in what particular industries predominate in an economy, 
cultural characteristics, and institutions can all translate into different convergence rates.  
Diminishing returns is always the general driving force, but the particulars vary. 
 
5.  Analysis of Balanced Growth Path Determinants 
  Just as there may be heterogeneity in the rates of convergence towards balanced 
growth paths, there may also be heterogeneity in the balance growth paths themselves.  In 
particular, there can be heterogeneity in the height of the balanced growth path and/or the 
                                                 
18 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for details.   14
slope of the path (the balanced growth rate).  In this section we consider a selection of 
conditioning variables and their estimated coefficients.  In our regressions, these 
coefficients indicate the effect of these variables on the average growth rate of per capita 
income indirectly via the height of the balanced growth paths.  Given the height of a 
balanced growth path, the average growth rate increases (if the balanced growth path is 
higher) or decreases (if the balanced growth path is lower) as a result of the distance of 
per capita income from the balanced growth path and the convergence effect towards that 
path.
19  
  The variables we focus on here are grouped into public sector size variables, 
educational attainment variables, and industry composition variables.  (Again, table 1 
gives descriptions and sources of these and all other conditioning variables.)  In each case 
we focus on 2SLS estimates.
20  We discuss the results for the entire sample and we 
examine the results for states as individual economic units to address potential 
heterogeneity. 
 
i.  Size of the Public Sector 
  Does “big government” foster or hinder economic growth?  This query expresses 
a fundamental concern about the proper extent of the public sector in economic life.  A 
large literature has explored this question.
21  In a cross section of countries, Barro (1991) 
found that a large public sector is growth hindering.  Easterly and Rebelo (1993), also in 
a cross section of countries, found that public investment in transportation and 
communication are associated positively with economic growth, but that any links 
between growth and other fiscal variables are fragile.  Evans and Karras (1994) reported 
                                                 
19 If conditional convergence were to be rejected, then these coefficients would be interpreted as influences 
on economies’ balanced growth rates.  However, since we report results only for states where 2SLS 
convergence rates were statistically different than zero, conditioning variable coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as effects on the height of balanced growth paths throughout this paper.   
20 Full results for all conditioning variables using both OLS and 2SLS are included in the referees appendix. 
21 The empirical framework used in this paper relates variables to the economic growth rate of economies.  
Many studies have, instead, focused on the level of income rather than its growth rate.  Slemrod (1995) 
provided a review of these studies and their relation to growth rate studies.  He noted that, “level studies 
primarily try to explain G [the extent of government] and include Y [income] as one explanatory variable; 
that G might affect Y is ignored [while] the growth studies try to explain the growth rate of Y . . . and often 
include G as one of the explanatory variables”(p.399).  The simultaneity problem must be noted.  However, 
to keep discussion in this paper focused we refer only to the growth rate studies and, in particular, those 
based on the neoclassical growth model.  For other approaches see Gramlich (1994) and Slemrod (1995).   15
that government activities, with the exception of expenditures on education services, are 
either unproductive or affect growth negatively.  More recently, Folster and Henrekson 
(2001) studied a panel of wealthy nations and concluded that there is a strong negative 
relationship between public expenditures and economic growth.
22  
  All of the above studies used various government expenditure variables to capture 
the size and scope of government activities.  We, in contrast, use the percent of a 
county’s population employed by the federal, state and local governments.  These 
variables offer several advantages over expenditure variables.  First, separate measures 
for federal, state and local government allow us to explore how the relationship between 
extent of the public sector and growth differs at three levels of decentralization.  Second, 
the three separate measures can help to alleviate problems of interpreting coefficients 
when externalities exist across economies.  At least the local government variable should 
be nearly immune to spill-over effects.   
Our government employment variables are also complementary to the expenditure 
variables of previous studies.  First, the employment variables can be interpreted as a 
stock of government activities/roles producing a flow of services, while government 
expenditures are the flow of services itself.  Second, while previous studies directly 
account for government expenditure, our employment variables directly account for the 
extent to which government is involved, i.e. the percent of labor force activities directed 
by government.
23   Third, while expenditure measures can often provide useful 
differentiation of roles of government (e.g. education versus other roles (Evans and 
Karras, 1994)), our employment variables provide another differentiation of roles (i.e. 
those associated with federal government versus those of state and local governments).   
  Table 4 summarizes the results for the full sample and for the same states 
reported for section 4.  In the full sample, we find a negative relationship between the 
                                                 
22 An important paper by Levine and Renelt (1992) demonstrated that conclusions from cross-country 
regressions may not be robust to small changes in the set of conditioning variables.  In particular, “a broad 
array of fiscal-expenditure variables [that have been] considered by the profession, are not robustly 
correlated with growth”(p.943).  Of note, the 2SLS approach theoretically yields consistent estimators for 
conditioning variable coefficients regardless of the specific set included.  As well, our set of conditioning 
variables is large (even in the individual state regressions (33)) and, therefore, minimizes omitted variable 
bias in practice.  
23 Of course, expenditure and involvement are not mutually exclusive.  Government expends wages so that 
labor is involved in government activities.   16
percent of the population employed by government and the rate of economic growth.  
The effect is negative and statistically significant regardless of whether one considers 
federal, state or local government.  Furthermore, there is no clear pattern of the public 
sector having less of a negative effect at increasingly more decentralized levels. The 
coefficients for the federal, state and local variables are –0.0222, –0.0163, and –0.0204 
respectively (all significant at the 1 percent level).
24 
  Considering each state separately, there are numerous cases of significant 
coefficients on the government employment variables.  In 9 out of 25 states examined, 
the federal government coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level or better; 8 out of 
25 for the state government coefficients; 5 out of 25 for the local government 
coefficients.  All but 2 of these 22 of these significant coefficient estimates are of 
negative sign.  Interestingly, the only 2 positive coefficients are both for the state of 
North Dakota (the federal and local government employment variables) and are large 
(0.2289 and 0.2417 respectively).  Aside from this outlier state, the results are 
qualitatively homogenous across states: government at all levels is negatively correlated 
with economic growth paths.  
  For individual state coefficients on the federal, state and local government 
variables there exists considerable overlap of the confidence intervals.  In fact, using a 95 
percent confidence standard, for the federal government coefficients no two can be 
rejected as identical.  Similarly for the state variable coefficients.  The only exception is 
the local government coefficient for North Dakota which is large, positive and significant 
at the 5 percent level.  However, that North Dakota is an outlier in the analysis has 
already been noted.  Setting that state aside, the overall picture that emerges is one where 
government at all levels hinders economic growth, and one where discernable differences 
between “good” versus “bad” government across states cannot be detected.       
 
                                                 
24 While these findings suggest that an increased public sector hinders economic growth via distortion of 
incentives and diversion of resources, another possible interpretation is that non-government wage growth 
simply outpaces government wage growth.  In Higgins et al (2003) we assembled government and non-
government wage data for the 1970-1998 period.  At the state and federal level, non-government wages 
outpaced government wages in only just above half of U.S. counties (55 percent), and at the local level, 
government wages grew faster in 70 percent of counties.  So for federal and state levels, the story does not 
seem economically important enough to account for the estimated result, and at the local level it would 
work against a negative effect appearing.     17
ii. Educational  Attainment 
 As  Table 1 indicates, our data include eight different variables measuring 
educational attainment within U.S. counties.  We focus on four of these variables: the 
percent of the population with (a) 9-11 years of education, (b) a high school diploma and 
no more, (c) some college education but less than a bachelor degree, and (d) a bachelor 
degree and/or higher degrees.
25  Table 5 reports the 2SLS coefficient estimates for the 
select educational attainment variables for the full sample and within-state samples.  
  We first consider the percent of the population with at least 9 years of education, 
but less than a high school (or its equivalent) degree.  For the full sample the coefficient 
is –0.0221 and is significant at the 1 percent level.  This seems sensible.  It implies that 
the greater percentage of an economy’s population without the remedial mathematics, 
writing and communications skills – as well as the minimum personal discipline and 
social behavior – necessary to obtain a high school diploma, the lower the economy’s 
balanced growth path.  Passing that threshold, the coefficient for the population 
achieving, but not surpassing, a high school diploma has a point estimate of 0.0097 
(significant at the 1 percent level). 
  More surprisingly, for the full sample the coefficient for the percent of the 
population with some college education but not enough for a bachelor degree is negative 
and insignificant.  Compare this to the coefficient on the percent of the population with a 
bachelor degree or more: 0.0732 and significant at the 1 percent level.  A possible 
interpretation of this result concerns the opportunity cost of education.  College education 
ostensibly involves a benefit in the form of increased skills/productivity for the 
individual, but it also involves a cost in the form of foregone wages.  The results may 
imply that college education of at least 4 years represents (on average) a positive net 
return to individuals, while the net return on a 2-year degree is questionable.
26 
                                                 
25 The remaining four variables (for public and private elementary schools and nurseries) we get mixed 
results in the full sample in terms of statistical significance.  Although two of them have statistically 
significant estimated coefficient values, none of the coefficients represent economically significant effects.  
The point estimates of all coefficients for the full sample are zero up to four decimals. 
26 Kane and Rouse (1995) and Surette (1997) reported that the estimated return to 2-year degrees is positive 
and equals about 4-6 percent and 7-10 percent, respectively.  Neither of these studies uses county-level 
data.  In addition, these studies do not take into account the social return, rather than the private return to 
individuals, as our results presumably do.  Both Kane and Rouse and Surette’s studies looked at 
individuals’ costs (tuition, wages forgone, experience forgone, etc.) and benefits (wage premiums) while 
we consider the effect of educational attainment on the average growth of an economy over a 30-year   18
  In all four of these categories we can detect some heterogeneity across states.  In 
the case of the less than high school degree attainment variable, there are 6 statistically 
significant (10 percent level or better) within-state coefficient estimates.  They range 
from –0.0904 (South Dakota; 1 percent level) to 0.1171 (Colorado; 5 percent level).  This 
result is puzzling.  Why would there be some individual states where having a larger 
percent of the population without a high school diploma be conducive to economic 
growth?   One potential explanation concerns compulsory education laws.  The variable 
may include many people who would have had a high school education given their 
druthers, and benefited their economy by being forced to.  On the other hand, there is an 
opportunity cost forced on rather-be-truant individuals and a direct cost on school system 
to deal with them as well.  If individuals  pushed through the school system while not 
receiving/accepting the benefits of education, they also forego the productive 
opportunities available meanwhile. However, the data is silent.  Each of the 6 states has 
roughly similar age spans of compulsion –  7 to 16 (Alabama, Colorado, Illinois and 
North Carolina), 6 to 16 (South Dakota), or 6 to 18 (Texas) years old
27 – and there is no 
apparent correlation between these small differences and the coefficient estimates.   
Some heterogeneity also is detected across the significant high school diploma 
variable coefficients.  Of the 8 coefficient estimates significant at the 10 percent level or 
better, 2 of them are negative (Mississippi and Ohio) and 1 has a 95 percent confidence 
interval entirely in the negative range (Mississippi).  However, among the 6 coefficients 
with positive point estimates there is no statistically significant difference between them.   
One straightforward explanation for the detected heterogeneity is simply that schools are 
better in some states than others.  This hypothesis can be informally tested by comparing 
average scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores from the states with negative coefficient 
estimates to those with positive coefficient estimates.  Indeed, Ohio has both the lowest 
                                                                                                                                                 
period.  What we might be detecting in our results, therefore, is a questionable social return to associate 
degrees.  This is a potentially important finding for policy-makers.  As Kane and Rouse (1995, p.600n) 
noted, “Twenty percent of Federal Pell Grants, 10 percent of Guaranteed Student Loans, and over 20 
percent of state expenditures for postsecondary education, go to community colleges.” 
27 These laws are from a report by the U.S. Department of Education (2001a), except for the Colorado law, 
which comes from the Colorado Department of Education.   19
math and verbal average scores.  However, Mississippi has SAT average scores neither 
exceptionally high nor low relative to the other seven states.
28  
No statistically significant heterogeneity can be detected among coefficients for 
the some college variable.  Still, it should be noted that every statistically significant 
coefficient is positive.  We cannot detect heterogeneity for the bachelor degree or more 
variable either.   
 
iii. Industry  Composition  Effects 
Our data include 16 industry-level variables, each measuring the percent of the 
population employed in the given industry.  Table 1 includes the full list.  Here we focus 
on three industry categories that are of a priori interest and had significant estimated 
effects for the full sample: (a) finance, insurance and real estate, (b) educational services, 
and (c) entertainment and recreational services.  The coefficients estimates for these 
variables for the full sample and individual state samples are summarized in Table 6. 
a.  Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Services 
  We find a significant, positive correlation between the percent of the population 
employed in finance, insurance and real estate services and economic growth in the full 
sample.  The point coefficient estimate is 0.0777 and is significant at the 1 percent level.  
A possible reason for the correlation is a link between financial intermediation and 
economic growth.  Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) use data from 1870 to 1920 to 
document quantitatively important links between financial intensity and per capita output 
levels in five OECD countries.  Furthermore, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King 
and Levine (1993) provided theoretical models rationalizing this link.  In the Greenwood 
and Jovanovic model, as financial intermediation becomes more prevalent, agents gain 
confidence in intermediaries’ ability to allocate funds profitably.  This leads to better 
matching of funds to productive investments and, consequently, to greater growth.  In 
King and Levine’s model, greater intermediation enhances information gathering 
potential and allows for funding of productive investment by less-well-established firms 
that otherwise would remain un-funded. 
                                                 
28 The SAT score test of the hypothesis, however, relies on an assumption that the predominant portion of 
the population with high school degrees obtained their high school degrees in the considered state.  For 
entire states, this seems a priori plausible but not certain.   20
We find qualitative, as well as quantitative, heterogeneity across within state 
coefficients.  For 7 states coefficient estimates are significant at the 10 percent level or 
better.  For 2 states (Idaho and Louisiana) the estimates are negative.  For each of the 7 
states, the coefficient is statistically different (at the 95 percent level) from the coefficient 
of at least one other state.  We find this interesting because, as Wachtel (2003, p.34) 
states, “Economists now take it for granted that a well-developed, market oriented 
financial sector contributes to economic growth.”  The significant negative correlations in 
2 states begs the question of what forces are there thwarting the conventional wisdom.  
Unfortunately, an answer is beyond the scope of the present work. 
b. Educational  Services 
  Unlike educational attainment levels, the percent of the population providing 
education services is negatively correlated with economic growth in the full sample 
(point estimate –0.0334 and significant at the 1 percent level).  Furthermore, no 
significant heterogeneity is detected across states.  For the 6 states with coefficient 
estimates significant at the 10 percent level or better, each and every point estimate is 
negative.  As well, only 1 state’s coefficient estimate is significant at better than the 10 
percent level (Indiana;1 percent level).   Therefore none of the coefficients are 
statistically different from another at the 5 percent level.   
  Why a negative correlation between the percent of the population providing 
educational services and economic growth?  Perhaps the benefits of education provided 
in a county are not entirely internalized by the county itself.  We report a positive 
correlation between human capital and economic growth (section 5.ii.), but the 
correlation is silent as to where the stock is accumulated.  For example, individuals may 
attend college or university where human capital is relatively easy to accumulate, and 
then move to other counties as they join the workforce.
29 
30 
                                                 
29 In Higgins et al (2003) we found that the negative association is particularly strong in metro counties.  
This is consistent with an externality argument in that a large proportion of colleges and universities are in 
metro areas, but many students leave the metro areas upon graduation.  The effect in a sample of only non-
metro counties, as a matter of fact, was not statistically significant. 
30 Another explanation for the negative relationship is bureaucratic over-expansion of the public school 
systems.  This hypothesis is frequently entertained in the popular media and was explored by Marlow 
(2001) in the California primary and secondary school districts.  However, Marlow found that an increase 
in the number of teachers has no statistically significant effect on SAT scores or dropout rates, and an 
increase in the size of administrative staff increases the SAT scores and decreases dropout rates.       21
c.  Entertainment and Recreational Services 
  The estimated effect of the percent of the population employed in entertainment 
and recreation industries is positive and significant (1 percent level) in the full sample 
(point estimate 0.0477).  This effect may be an important one.  First, to put it in 
perspective, the estimated partial correlation is larger (in absolute value) than that for any 
of the public sector extent variables.  Second, Costa (1997, Table 1) has reported that, as 
a percent of U.S. households’ budgets, recreation expenditures rose from 1.9 percent 
around 1890, to 4.5 percent in 1950, and then 5.6 percent in 1991.  Thus entertainment 
and recreation services comprise an increasingly large segment of the U.S. economy. 
  Within states, 6 had estimated coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or 
better.  All of them are positive.  There are only two coefficients estimates (California 
and Mississippi) that are statistically different from one another at the 5 percent level.
31   
  The positive correlation between recreation and entertainment industry with 
economic growth might be capturing the attraction of economic activity to counties 
where gambling casinos and professional sports teams are located.  Siegfried and 
Zimbalist (2000, p.114) reported that by 2005 there will be 95 professional sports 
stadiums having been constructed since 1990, and more than $27.1 billion will be spent 
on these stadiums.
32  Eadington (1999, p.173) reported that gross gaming revenues 
reached $540 billion in 1997.  In addition, Walker and Jackson (1998) documented 
economic growth being stimulated by the introduction of casino industries.  The within-
state results can offer little insight into the above hypothesis.  California, Georgia and 
New York all have at least one professional team in the NHL, NBA, MLB and NFL.  
However, Indiana has only an NBA team, and Louisiana and Mississippi have no teams 
in any of these major professional sports leagues.  Likewise,  Indiana, Louisiana and 
Mississippi allow for casinos, while California, Georgia and New York do not.   
 
6. Conclusions 
                                                 
31 Interestingly, of the 7 coefficient estimates, California has the lowest point estimate.  It is still positive 
and significant but “common knowledge” might suggest that the home of Hollywood would be one where 
entertainment industry fostered economic growth. 
32 “Professional sport” refers to the NHL, the MLB, the NFL and the NBA.   22
  We utilize a county-level data set to explore growth determination in the U.S. and 
possible heterogeneity in the determination process across individual states.  The data set 
includes over 3,000 cross-sectional observations and 39 demographic conditioning 
variables to control for variation in the balanced growth paths.  Combined with this data 
we exploit a consistent two stage least squares estimation procedure that does not bias 
convergence rate estimates downward (as does conventional OLS).  However, we report 
OLS estimates as well. 
  Convergence across the U.S. averages nearly 7 percent per year – higher than the 
2 percent normally found with OLS in cross-country and U.S. state samples.   Across 
individual states, estimated convergence rates for 32 states are above 2 percent with an 
average of 8.1 percent.  For 29 states the convergence rate is above 2 percent with 95 
percent confidence.  We find substantial heterogeneity in individual state convergence 
rates.  For 7 states the convergence rate can be rejected as identical to at least one other 
state’s convergence rate with 95 percent confidence.  The high convergence rates are 
encouraging in the sense that, given proper policies to induce and support balanced 
growth paths similar to leader economies, laggard economies can close the gap relatively 
quickly to what previous research has suggested.  However, there is a grain of salt.  If 
significant heterogeneity exists in convergence rates across U.S. states, as the county-
level data indicates, the heterogeneity across different nations could be greater, and 
convergence rates could well be lower for certain economies. 
  In examining the determinants of balanced growth path heights, we find that 
government at all levels of decentralization is negatively correlated with economic 
growth.  Educational attainment of a population has a non-linear relationship with 
economic growth according to our estimates: growth is positively related to high-school 
degree attainment, seemingly unrelated to obtaining some college education, and then 
positively related to four-year or more degree attainment.  Also, finance, insurance and 
real estate industry and entertainment industry are positively correlated with growth, 
while education industry is negatively correlated with growth.  Heterogeneity in the 
effects of balanced growth path determinants across individual states is much harder to 
detect or dismiss than heterogeneity of convergence rates.          
         23
Data Appendix: Measurement of Per Capita Income 
Because of the critical importance of the income variable for the study of growth 
and convergence, we want to address its measurement in some detail. Two options were 
available to us for the construction of the county-level per capita income variable: (1) 
Census Bureau database, and (2) BEA-REIS database. 
Income information collected by the Census Bureau for states and counties is 
prepared decennially from the “long-form” sample conducted as part of the overall 
population census (BEA, 1994). This money income information is based on the self-
reported values by Census Survey respondents. An advantage of the Census Bureau’s 
data is that they are reported and recorded by place of residence. These data, however, are 
available only for the “benchmark” years, i.e., the years in which the decennial Census 
survey is conducted. 
The second source for this data, and the one chosen for this project, is personal 
income as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
33 The definitions that 
are used for the components of personal income for the county estimates are essentially 
the same as those used for the national estimates. For example, the BEA defines 
“personal income” as the sum of wage and salary disbursements, other labor income, 
proprietors’ income (with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), 
rental income (with capital consumption adjustment), personal dividend income and 
personal interest income. (BEA, 1994) “Wage and salary disbursements’ are 
measurements of pre-tax income paid to employees. “Other labor income” consists of 
payments by employers to employee benefit plans. “Proprietors’ income” is divided into 
two separate components—farm and non-farm. Per capita income is defined as the ratio 
of this personal income measure to the population of an area. 
The BEA’s estimates of personal income reflect the revised national estimates of 
personal income that resulted from the 1991 comprehensive revision and the 1992 and 
1993 annual revisions of the national income and product accounts. The revised national 
estimates were incorporated into the local area estimates of personal income as part of a 
                                                 
33 The data and their measurement methods are described in detail in “Local Area Personal Income, 1969–
1992” published by the BEA under the Regional Accounts Data, February 2, 2001.   24
comprehensive revision in May 1993. In addition, the estimates incorporate source data 
that were not available in time to be used in the comprehensive revisions.
34 
The BEA compiles data from several different sources in order to derive this 
personal income measure. Some of the data used to prepare the components of personal 
income are reported and recorded by place of work rather than place of residence. 
Therefore, the initial estimates of these components are on a place-of-work basis. 
Consequently, these initial place-of-work estimates are adjusted so that they will be on a 
place-of-residence basis and so that the income of the recipients whose place of residence 
differs from their place of work will be correctly assigned to their county of residence. 
As a result, a place of residence adjustment is made to the data. This adjustment is 
made for inter-county commuters and border workers utilizing journey-to-work (JTW) 
data collected by Census. For the county estimates, the income of individuals who 
commute between counties is important in every multi-county metropolitan area and in 
many non-metropolitan areas. The residence adjustment estimate for a county is 
calculated as the total inflows of the income subject to adjustment to county i from 
county j minus the total outflows of the income subject to adjustment from county i to 
county j. The estimates of the inflow and outflow data are prepared at the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) level and are calculated from the JTW data on the number 
of wage and salary workers and on their average wages by county of work for each 
county of residence from the Population Census.  
 
                                                 
34 For details of these revisions, see “Local Area Personal Income: Estimates for 1990–92 and Revisions to 
the Estimates for 1981–91,” Survey of Current Business 74 (April 1994), 127–129.   25
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and their Source 
 
Variable Definition  Period  Source 
Income 




Land Area  Land Area in km
2  1970-1990 Census
36 
Water Area  Water Area in km
2  1970-1990 Census 
Age: 5-13 years  Percent of 5–13 year olds in the population  1970-1990  Census 
Age: 14-17 years  Percent of 14–17 year olds in the 
population 
1970-1990 Census 
Age: 18-64 years  Percent of 18–64 year olds in the 
population 
1970-1990 Census 
Age: 65+  Percent of 65+ olds  1970-1990  Census 
Blacks  Percent of Blacks  1970-1990  Census 
Hispanic  Percent of Hispanics  1970-1990  Census 
Education: 9-11 years  Percent of population with 11 years 
education or less 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: H.S. diploma  Percent of population with high school 
diploma 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Some college  Percent of population with some college 
education 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Bachelor +  Percent of population with bachelor degree 
or above 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public elementary  Number of students enrolled in public 
elementary schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public nursery  Number of students enrolled in public 
nurseries 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private elementary  Number of students enrolled in private 
elementary schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private nursery  Number of students enrolled in private 
nurseries 
1970-1990 Census 
Housing  Median house value  1970-1990  Census 
Federal government employment  Percent of population employed by the 
federal government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
State government employment  Percent of population employed by the 
state government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Local government employment  Percent of population employed by the 
local government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Self-employment  Percent of population self-employed  1970-1990  Census 
Agriculture  Percent of population employed in 
agriculture 
1970-1990 Census 
Communications  Percent of population employed in 
communications 
1970-1990 Census 
Construction  Percent of population employed in 
construction 
1970-1990 Census 
Finance, insurance & real estate  Percent of population employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: durables  Percent of population employed in 
Manufacturing of durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: non-durables  Percent of population employed in 
manufacturing of non-durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Mining    Percent of population employed in mining  1970-1990  Census 
Retail  Percent of population employed in retail 
trade 
1970-1990 Census 
Business & repair services  Percent of population employed in 
business and repair services 
1970-1990 Census 
Educational services  Percent of population employed in 
education services 
1970-1990 Census 
Professional related services  Percent of population employed in 
professional services 
1970-1990 Census 
Health services  Percent of population employed in health 
services 
1970-1990 Census 
                                                 
35  All BEA variables are available for each year from 1969-1998. 
36 Note, all Census variables are gathered from the 1970, 1980 & 1990 Census tapes.  Values for 1969 were obtained via the 
interpolation method as discussed in the data section. 
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Personal services  Percent of population employed in 
personal services 
1970-1990 Census 
Entertainment & recreational 
services 
Percent of population employed in 
entertainment and recreational services 
1970-1990 Census 
Transportation  Percent of population employed in 
transportation 
1970-1990 Census 
Wholesale trade  Percent of population employed in 
wholesale trade 
1970-1990 Census 
Poverty  Percent of the population living at or 
below the poverty level 
1970-1990 Census 
Metro area, 1970  Dummy Variable: 1 if the county was in a 
metro area in 1970, and 0 otherwise 
1970 Census 
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37  3,058     -0.0068  (15.88)* -0.0174  (22.15)* -0.0345  (24.19)*  
 
 
Alabama   67    -0.0039  (1.56)  -0.0251  (2.38)**  -0.0334  (20.49)* 
Arkansas   74    -0.0086  (3.20)*  -0.0267  (4.48)*  -0.0384  (22.08)* 
California   58      0.0218  (3.99)*
   -0.0261 (2.50)**  -0.0235 (4.87)* 
Colorado   63    -0.0041  (1.26)  -0.0134  (2.53)**  -0.0318  (13.41)* 
Florida    67       0.0026 (0.81)  -0.0190 (2.06)**  -0.0319 (14.98)* 
Georgia   159    -0.0065  (3.09)*  -0.0171  (4.33)*  -0.0367  (36.46)*   
Idaho   44    -0.0182  (3.66)*  -0.0403  (2.23)**  -0.0406  (10.03)* 
Illinois   102    -0.0030  (1.41)  -0.0255  (5.46)*  -0.0281  (9.07)*
  
Indiana    92       0.0004 (0.11)  -0.0061 (1.02)  -0.0299 (9.25)* 
Iowa   99    -0.0069  (1.85)***  -0.0288  (5.65)*  -0.0289  (4.75)* 
Kansas   106    -0.0163  (7.84)*  -0.0286  (9.76)*  -0.0301  (12.18)* 
Kentucky   120    -0.0043  (2.85)*  -0.0253  (6.11)*  -0.0354  (19.74)* 
Louisiana   64    -0.0032  (1.22)  -0.0222  (3.83)*  -0.0413  (13.83)* 
Michigan    83       0.0056 (2.14)**  -0.0104 (1.36)  -0.0387 (16.52)* 
Minnesota   87    -0.0056  (2.44)**  -0.0156  (2.85)*  -0.0260  (9.34)* 
Mississippi  82       0.0012 (0.43)  -0.0182 (2.05)**  -0.0448 (13.43)*   
Missouri   115    -0.0038  (2.34)**  -0.0171  (3.78)*  -0.0455  (10.74)* 
Montana   56    -0.0244  (5.31)*  -0.0229  (3.31)*  -0.0328  (9.14)* 
New York   62       0.0120 (4.45)*   0.0129 (1.24)  -0.0264 (7.78)* 
North Carolina  100      -0.0033 (1.47)  -0.0171 (3.32)*  -0.0467 (7.11)* 
North Dakota  53      -0.0119 (1.85)***  -0.0279 (3.29)*  -0.0594 (4.79)* 
Ohio    88       0.0047 (1.83)***  -0.0136 (1.87)***  -0.0274 (7.68)* 
Oklahoma   77    -0.0123  (6.49)*  -0.0248  (3.95)*  -0.0387  (22.11)* 
Pennsylvania  67       0.0038 (1.31)  -0.0176 (2.53)**  -0.0312 (9.01)* 
South Carolina  46       0.0014 (0.53)  -0.0118 (0.62)  -0.0336 (5.97)* 
South Dakota  66       0.0003 (0.06)  -0.0193 (2.39)**  -0.0265 (4.77)* 
Tennessee    97      -0.0002 (0.07)  -0.0199 (3.55)*  -0.0392 (15.21)* 
Texas   254    -0.0086  (5.09)*  -0.0211  (8.10)*  -0.0356  (15.18)* 
Virginia    84       0.0016 (0.62)  -0.0045 (0.69)  -0.0348 (15.81)* 
Washington  39      -0.0129 (1.96)**  -0.0349 (1.09)  -0.0327 (9.29)* 
West Virginia  55      -0.0053 (1.81)***   0.0043 (0.43)  -0.0336 (15.49)* 
Wisconsin   70    -0.0009  (0.37)  -0.0191  (3.08)*  -0.0240  (6.83)* 
 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
 
*      significant at 1% level 
**    significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
 
                                                 
37 See Higgins, Levy and Young (2002).   31
 
 





State    Number of Counties      OLS Estimates & 95% C.I. 





39         3,058     0.0237 (0.0208, 0.0267)   0.0682 (0.0544, 0.0911) 
 
Alabama           67      0.0424 (0.0036, 0.1080)   0.0931 (0.0492, 0.1466) 
Arkansas           74      0.0479 (0.0166, 0.1098)   0.0738 (0.0570, 0.1363) 
California           58      0.0457 (0.0046, 0.1249)   0.0375 (0.0178, 0.0868)  
Colorado           63      0.0166 (0.0031, 0.0384)   0.0759 (0.0426, 0.1009) 
Florida             67      0.0268 (0.0010, 0.1109)   0.0767 (0.0480, 0.1174) 
Georgia           159      0.0230 (0.0109, 0.0413)   0.1043 (0.0699, 0.1142)   
Idaho             44      0.0892 (0.0021, 0.1566)   0.0913 (0.0471, 0.1145) 
Illinois            102      0.0434 (0.0213, 0.1168)   0.0537 (0.0337, 0.1062) 
Indiana             92      0.0067 (-0.0054, 0.0245)   0.0622 (0.0354, 0.1221) 
Iowa             99      0.0570 (0.0224, 0.1176)   0.0574 (0.0175, 0.0954)
 
Kansas            106      0.0560 (0.0360, 0.1086)   0.0639 (0.0434, 0.1228) 
Kentucky          120      0.0431 (0.0233, 0.0922)   0.1054 (0.0561, 0.1160) 
Louisiana           64      0.0341 (0.0128, 0.0955)   0.1555 (0.0989, 0.1940) 
Michigan            83      0.0121 (-0.0043, 0.0427)   0.1152 (0.0536, 0.1659) 
Minnesota           87      0.0202 (0.0053, 0.0459)   0.0454 (0.0305, 0.0719) 
Mississippi           82      0.0249 (0.0009, 0.1509)   0.1405 (0.0455, 0.1923)   
Missouri            115      0.0230 (0.0094, 0.0452)   0.0817 (0.0387, 0.1132) 
Montana             56      0.0359 (0.0099, 0.0996)   0.0865 (0.0367, 0.1566) 
New York           62      0.0111 (-0.0238, 0.0284)   0.0465 (0.0285, 0.0853) 
North Carolina          100      0.0228 (0.0078, 0.0491)   0.1302 (0.0966, 0.1574) 
North Dakota                53      0.0528 (0.0103, 0.1247)   0.0761 (0.0353, 0.1102) 
Ohio             88      0.0170 (-0.0005, 0.0520)   0.0503 (0.0299, 0.1059) 
Oklahoma           77      0.0415 (0.0139, 0.1136)   0.1152 (0.0574, 0.1437) 
Pennsylvania           67      0.0240 (  0.0043, 0.0707)   0.0705 (0.0291, 0.1099) 
South Carolina             46      0.0142 (-0.0147, 0.1259)   0.0960 (0.0243, 0.1315) 
South Dakota           66      0.0274 (0.0036, 0.1391)   0.0406 (0.0184, 0.1144) 
Tennessee            97      0.0287 (0.0102, 0.0689)   0.0681 (0.0488, 0.1168) 
Texas            254      0.0312 (0.0208, 0.0458)   0.1170 (0.0675, 0.1564) 
Virginia            84      0.0047 (-0.0074, 0.0227)   0.0703 (0.0500, 0.1271) 
Washington           39      0.0518 (-.0119, 0.0971)    0.0845 (0.0448, 0.1449) 
West Virginia           55      0.0040 (-0.0184, 0.0199)   0.0634 (0.0466, 0.0972) 
Wisconsin           70      0.0270 (0.0077, 0.0716)   0.0390 (0.0231, 0.0688) 
 
 
                                                 
38 Asymptotic convergence rates and 95% confidence intervals in parentheses reflect observations whose beta values, in Table 1, are 
not significant.   
39 See Higgins, Levy and Young (2002) for full set of results for the United States.   32
Table 4: Analysis of Select Government Variables 
 
     
      Federal Government Employment  _State Government Employment_ _Local  Government  Employment_ 
 
Region          Number of Counties ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ 
 
United States      3,058    -0.0222 (4.26)*  (-0.0119,-0.0324)  -0.0163 (4.07)*  (-0.0085, -0.0242)  -0.0204 (3.91)*  (-0.0101, -0.0305) 
Alabama        67     0.0391 (0.72)  (-0.0714, 0.1497)  -0.0131 (0.27)  (-0.1112, 0.0851)   0.0379 (0.71)  (-0.0712, 0.1472) 
Arkansas     74   -0.0142  (0.29)  (-0.1138,  0.0854)  -0.0408  (1.13)  (-0.1135,  0.0319)  -0.0392  (0.90)  (-0.1277,  0.0491) 
California       58     0.0352 (1.23)  (-0.0239, 0.0944)   0.0331 (0.84)  (-0.0477, 0.1140)   0.0462 (0.72)  (-0.0856, 0.1782) 
Colorado     63   -0.0609  (1.69)***  (-0.1384,  0.0165)  -0.0605  (1.66)***  (-0.1452,  0.0240)  -0.0215  (0.61)  (-0.0941,  0.0511) 
Florida        67     0.0280 (0.38)  (-0.1214, 0.1775)   0.0049 (0.09)  (-0.1082, 0.1181)  -0.0244 (0.28)  (-0.1997, 0.1508) 
Georgia        159    -0.0100 (0.28)  (-0.0802, 0.0601)   0.0035 (0.15)  (-0.0432, 0.0503)   0.0144 (0.48)  (-0.0455, 0.0745) 
Idaho        44    -0.1102 (1.94)***  (-0.2367, 0.0162)   0.0364 (1.10)  (-0.0371, 0.1098)   0.0280 (0.41)  (-0.1239, 0.1801) 
Illinois     102     0.0405  (1.24)  (-0.0247,  0.1058)  -0.0095  (0.51)  (-0.0473,  0.0281)  -0.0009  (0.04)  (-0.0485,  0.0467) 
Indiana     92   -0.0968  (2.03)**  (-0.1654,  0.0438)  -0.0043  (0.18)  (-0.0528,  0.0442)  -0.0319  (0.87)  (-0.1059,  0.0419) 
Iowa        99     0.0541 (1.43)  (-0.0212, 0.1294)  -0.0457 (2.32)**  (-0.0849, -0.0064)   0.0135 (0.51)  (-0.0400, 0.0671) 
Kansas        106     0.0253 (0.64)  (-0.0535, 0.1042)   0.0108 (0.67)  (-0.0213, 0.0431)   0.0179 (1.07)  (-0.0154, 0.0513) 
Kentucky     120   -0.0192  (1.85)***  (-0.0644,  0.0258)  -0.0041  (0.20)  (-0.0440,  0.0358)    -0.0078  (0.30)  (-0.0599,  0.0442) 
Louisiana     64   -0.0252  (1.73)***  (-0.0957,  0.0451)  -0.0160  (0.49)  (-0.0832.  0.0511)  -0.1652  (2.85)*  (-0.2836,  -0.0467) 
Michigan        83     0.0716 (1.45)  (-0.0273, 0.1706)  -0.0631 (2.33)**  (-0.1174, -0.0087)  -0.0332 (0.97)  (-0.1021, 0.0355) 
Minnesota     87   -0.0371  (0.61)  (-0.1588,  0.0845)  -0.0108  (0.47)  (-0.0577,  0.0360)  -0.0246  (1.03)  (-0.0725,  0.0232) 
Mississippi      82     0.0127 (0.21)  (-0.1092, 0.1347)   -0.0396 (0.84)  (-0.1341, 0.0548)  -0.1485 (2.51)**  (-0.2673, -0.0297) 
Missouri        115    -0.0917 (2.94)*  (-0.1539, -0.0295)  -0.0655 (2.77)*  (-0.1125, -0.0184)  -0.0205 (0.70)  (-0.0783, 0.0373) 
Montana     56   -0.0854  (1.37)  (-0.2149,  0.0441)  -0.0057  (0.14)  (-0.0911,  0.0797)  -0.0132  (0.32)  (-0.0995,  0.0731) 
New York       62     0.0966 (0.80)  (-0.1519, 0.3452)   0.0531 (1.19)  (-0.0382, 0.1446)   0.0072 (0.11)  (-0.1321, 0.1466) 
North Carolina      100    -0.1674 (3.06)*  (-0.2767, -0.0582)  -0.0432 (1.78)***  (-0.0919, 0.0053)  -0.0038 (0.07)  (-0.1112, 0.1034) 
North Dakota      53     0.2289 (2.00)***  (-0.0095, 0.4274)   0.1278 (1.55)  (-0.0445, 0.3001)   0.2417 (2.55)**  (0.0439, 0.4349) 
Ohio     88   -0.0232  (0.41)  (-0.1375,  0.0910)  -0.0318  (1.35)  (-0.0792,  0.0154)  -0.0202  (0.43)  (-0.1146,  0.0741) 
Oklahoma     77   -0.1022  (1.95)***  (-0.2078,  0.0034)  -0.0642  (1.84)***  (-0.1346,  0.0061)  -0.0902  (2.46)**  (-0.1641,  -0.0163) 
Pennsylvania      67     0.0167 (0.27)  (-0.1101, 0.1435)   0.0252 (0.96)  (-0.0282, 0.0786)  -0.1365 (2.22)**  (-0.2616, -0.0113) 
South Carolina      46    -0.0164 (0.20)  (-0.1920, 0.1591)  -0.0734 (1.76)***  (-0.2846, 0.1376)  -0.0184 (0.17)  (-0.2544, 0.2174) 
South Dakota      66    -0.0488 (1.05)  (-0.1433, 0.0455)  -0.0014 (0.04)  (-0.0719, 0.0691)  -0.0544 (1.23)  (-0.1449, 0.0359) 
Tennessee     97   -0.0032  (0.10)  (-0.0703,  0.0638)  -0.0615  (1.83)***  (-0.1288,  0.0057)    0.0067  (0.19)  (-0.0658,  0.0794) 
Texas     254   -0.0307  (0.96)  (-0.0938,  0.0323)  -0.0021  (0.11)  (-0.0385,  0.0343)  -0.0306  (1.35)  (-0.0755,  0.0141) 
Virginia     84   -0.0166  (0.42)  (-0.0975,  0.0642)  -0.0122  (0.29)  (-0.0964,  0.0718)    0.0234  (0.44)  (-0.0826,  0.1295) 
Washington    39   -0.0268  (0.42)  (-0.1930,  0.1392)  -0.0691  (0.57)  (-0.3816,  0.2434)  -0.1572  (0.69)  (-0.7462,  0.4316) 
West Virginia      55     0.0862 (1.20)  (-0.0631, 0.2356)   0.0147 (0.41)  (-0.0591, 0.0885)  -0.0250 (0.31)  (-0.1939, 0.1438) 
Wisconsin       70     0.0147 (0.45)  (-0.0522, 0.0818)  -0.0208 (0.68)  (-0.0835, 0.0417)   0.0459 (1.33)  (-0.0242, 0.1162) 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
*      significant at 1% level 
**    significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level   33
Table 5: Analysis of Select Education Variables 
          
  ____Some High School  Education___  ______   High School Diploma_____  ____   Some College Education  ____  ___   Bachelor Degree or Higher  ___ 
           
Region       ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.___ 
 
United States  -0.0221 (6.21)*  (-0.0292, -0.0152)   0.0097 (3.26)*  (0.0038, 0.0156)  -0.0025 (0.41)  (-0.0143, 0.0094)   0.0732 (12.01)* (0.0613,  0.0852) 
 
Alabama     0.0832 (2.07)**  (0.0015, 0.1649)   0.0832 (2.07)**  (0.0014, 0.1649)   0.1229 (1.41)  (-0.0538, 0.2997)   0.0448 (0.77)  (-0.0741, 0.1639) 
Arkansas    -0.0223 (0.73)  (-0.0844, 0.0397)   0.0153 (0.49)  (-0.0478, 0.0786)   0.0492 (0.75)  (-0.0832, 0.1818)   0.1188 (1.56)  (-0.0346, 0.2723) 
California   -0.0673 (1.02)  (-0.2041, 0.0694)  -0.0212 (0.60)  (-0.0941, 0.0515)   0.0513 (0.77)  (-0.0857, 0.1884)   0.1003 (2.36)*  (0.0126, 0.1880) 
Colorado     0.1171 (2.44)**  (0.0191, 0.2151)   0.0654 (2.23)**  (0.0053, 0.1255)   0.0600 (0.90)  (-0.0769, 0.1969)   0.1178 (3.03)*  (0.0382, 0.1974) 
Florida    -0.0045 (0.07)  (-0.1282, 0.1193)   0.0649 (0.95)  (-0.0750, 0.2048)   0.1813 (1.69)***  (-0.0372, 0.3998)   0.1094 (1.28)  (-0.0647, 0.2837) 
Georgia     0.0087 (0.58)  (-0.0210, 0.0384)   0.0103 (0.60)  (-0.0240, 0.0447)   0.0715 (1.77)***  (-0.0084, 0.1515)   0.0279 (0.90)   (-0.0335, 0.0894) 
Idaho     0.0612 (0.93)  (-0.0859, 0.2085)   0.0893 (2.31)**  (0.0031, 0.1755)  -0.0052 (0.11)  (-0.1135, 0.1030)   0.0656 (0.65)  (-0.1579, 0.2891) 
Illinois    -0.0587 (3.22)*  (-0.0952, -0.0223)  -0.0149 (1.38)  (-0.0364, 0.0066)   0.0280 (0.89)  (-0.0345, 0.0907)   0.0495 (1.61)  (-0.0117, 0.1108)  
Indiana    -0.0333 (1.31)  (-0.0842, 0.0175)  -0.0220 (1.37)  (-0.0542, 0.0102)   0.1129 (2.09)**  (0.0045, 0.2214)   0.0406 (0.82)  (-0.0584, 0.1396) 
Iowa    -0.0314 (1.28)  (-0.0803, 0.0174)  -0.0003 (0.03)  (-0.0245, 0.0238)   0.0157 (0.58)  (-0.0383, 0.0698)  -0.0369 (1.20)  (-0.0983, 0.0244) 
Kansas    -0.0281 (1.34)  (-0.0697, 0.0135)   0.0556 (4.49)*  (0.0309, 0.0804)  -0.0031 (0.16)  (-0.0414, 0.0351)   0.0403 (1.54)  (-0.0118, 0.0925) 
Kentucky     0.0140 (0.51)  (-0.0410, 0.0692)   0.0562 (3.07)*  (0.0198, 0.0925)   0.0769 (1.77)***  (-0.0096, 0.1635)   0.0711 (1.55)  (-0.0202, 0.1625) 
Louisiana     0.0188 (0.73)  (-0.0340, 0.0717)  -0.0178 (0.86)  (-0.0600, 0.0243)   0.0717 (1.19)  (-0.0509, 0.1943)   0.0707 (1.19)  (-0.0508, 0.1922) 
Michigan    -0.0428 (1.34)  (-0.1067, 0.0211)  -0.0187 (0.77)  (-0.0677, 0.0302)  -0.0079 (0.15)  (-0.1131, 0.0972)   0.0873 (2.44)**  (0.0154, 0.1592) 
Minnesota   -0.0142 (0.43)  (-0.0803, 0.0520)   0.0053 (0.31)  (-0.0290, 0.0396)   0.0441 (1.23)  (-0.0281, 0.1165)   0.0273 (0.64)  (-0.0578, 0.1126) 
Mississippi   0.0095 (0.30)  (-0.0551, 0.0743)  -0.0950 (2.24)**  (-0.1804, -0.0095)  -0.0352 (0.57)  (-0.1595, 0.0891)   0.0182 (0.25) (-0.1294,  0.1659) 
Missouri    -0.0226 (0.83)  (-0.0773, 0.0319)   0.0187 (1.11)  (-0.0149, 0.0523)  -0.0271 (0.71)  (-0.1028, 0.0484)   0.1255 (3.50)*  (0.0542, 0.1969) 
Montana    -0.1081 (1.54)  (-0.2529, 0.0368)  -0.0028 (0.07)  (-0.0856, 0.0799)   0.0100 (0.24)  (-0.0755, 0.0956)   0.0085 (0.17)  (-0.0983, 0.1154) 
New York    0.0306 (0.68)  (-0.0616, 0.1229)  -0.0719 (1.51)  (-0.1697, 0.0258)   0.0193 (0.26)  (-0.1324, 0.1712)   0.1734 (3.31)*  (0.0661, 0.2807) 
North Carolina   0.0395 (1.85)***  (-0.0031, 0.0821)   0.0223 (1.07)  (-0.0193, 0.0641)  -0.0162 (0.34)  (-0.1125, 0.0800)   0.1134 (3.02)* (0.0384,  0.1883) 
North Dakota   0.0309 (0.62)  (-0.0735, 0.1354)  -0.0729 (1.82)***  (-0.1568, 0.0108)   0.1838 (2.78)**  ( 0.0456, 0.3221)   0.1245 (1.35) (-0.0677,  0.3167) 
Ohio     0.0171 (0.60)  (-0.0400, 0.0742)  -0.0317 (1.87)***  (-0.0656, 0.0022)   0.1305 (2.62)*  ( 0.0305, 0.2306)   0.0691 (1.58)  (-0.0187, 0.1571) 
Oklahoma   -0.0018 (0.05)  (-0.0769, 0.0732)   0.0556 (2.43)**  (0.0095, 0.1017)   0.0728 (1.54)  (-0.0226, 0.1683)   0.0230 (0.59)  (-0.0553, 0.1014) 
Pennsylvania  -0.0021 (0.07)  (-0.0626, 0.0584)  -0.0331 (1.59)  (-0.0754, 0.0091)   0.0121 (0.20)  (-0.1105, 0.1348)   0.2049 (4.32)* (0.1085,  0.3014) 
South Carolina  -0.0098 (0.20)  (-0.1160, 0.0962)  -0.1084 (1.48)  (-0.2676, 0.0508)   0.1236 (0.66)  (-0.2876, 0.5355)   0.0301 (0.17) (-0.3684,  0.4249) 
South Dakota  -0.0904 (2.58)*  (-0.1621, -0.0186)   0.0181 (0.80)  (-0.0279, 0.0642)   0.0352 (0.72)  (-0.0647, 0.1353)  -0.0811 (1.39) (-0.1999,  0.0376) 
Tennessee    0.0093 (0.33)  (-0.0477, 0.0665)   0.0077 (0.26)  (-0.0511, 0.0666)  -0.0673 (1.10)  (-0.1897, 0.0549)   0.1732 (3.04)*  (0.0592, 0.2872) 
Texas    -0.0594 (4.85)*  (-0.0836, -0.0353)   0.0061 (0.45)  (-0.0208, 0.0330)   0.0282 (1.28)  (-0.0153, 0.0717)  -0.0175 (0.70)  (-0.0667, 0.0315) 
Virginia     0.0128 (0.48)  (-0.0412, 0.0668)   0.0157 (0.54)  (-0.0429, 0.0744)  -0.0211 (0.28)  (-0.1756, 0.1333)   0.0961 (1.68)***  (-0.0191, 0.2114) 
Washington   0.0307 (0.21)  (-0.3521, 0.4135)   0.0146 (0.12)  (-0.2885, 0.3178)   0.0199 (0.28)  (-0.1656, 0.2055)   0.1531 (0.95)  (-0.2609, 0.5673) 
West Virginia   0.0470 (0.81)  (-0.0733, 0.1674)  -0.0223 (0.50)  (-0.1146, 0.0700)  -0.0134 (0.15)  (-0.2037, 0.1768)   0.1089 (0.98) (-0.1206,  0.3385) 
Wisconsin   -0.0276 (0.95)  (-0.0855, 0.0308)  -0.0268 (1.62)  (-0.0605, 0.0067)   0.0229 (0.71)  (-0.0424, 0.0884)   0.0923 (2.56)**  (0.0195, 0.1652) 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
 
*     significant at 1% level 
**    significant at 5% level 
***   significant at 10% level     34
Table 6: Analysis of Select Industry Composition Variables 
           
            Finance, Insurance, Real Estate    _                 Educational Services           _  Entertainment & Recreational Services 
 
Region           Number of Counties ____2SLS___        95% C.I.    _ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.    _ ____2SLS___        95% C.I.   _ 
 
United States      3,058     0.0777 (6.16)*  (0.0529, 0.1024)  -0.0334 (3.90)*  (-0.0502, -0.0166)   0.0477 (2.89)*  (0.0153, 0.0800) 
 
Alabama     67     0.2583  (1.80)***  (-0.0331,  0.5498)  -0.1639  (0.94)  (-0.5202,  0.1924)  -0.0954  (0.32)  (-0.7085,  0.5175)   
Arkansas        74     0.0464 (0.43)  (-0.1728, 0.2657)   0.1168 (1.52)  (-0.0386, 0.2722)  -0.0676 (0.38)  (-0.4296, 0.2943) 
California       58     0.0899 (1.10)  (-0.0792, 0.2591)   0.0332 (0.29)  (-0.2047, 0.2711)   0.1498 (2.31)**  ( 0.0161, 0.2836) 
Colorado        63     0.1091 (1.08)  (-0.0972, 0.3154)   0.0650 (0.96)  (-0.0730, 0.2030)   0.0928 (0.96)  (-0.1057, 0.2914) 
Florida        67     0.0561 (0.48)  (-0.1825, 0.2947)  -0.4116 (2.04)**  (-0.8220, -0.0012)   0.1004 (0.39)  (-0.4225, 0.6235) 
Georgia        159    -0.0697 (0.90)  (-0.2224, 0.0829)   0.0588 (0.87)  (-0.0751, 0.1928)   0.2271 (1.69)***  (-0.0389, 0.4932) 
Idaho        44    -0.3772 (2.34)**  (-0.7360, -0.0184)  -0.2396 (1.93)***  (-0.6175, 0.0522)  -0.2443 (0.79)  (-0.9308, 0.4421)  
Illinois        102     0.1018 (2.21)**  (0.0100, 0.1935)  -0.1139 (1.68)***  (-0.2519, 0.0240)   0.3780 (2.29)**   ( 0.0481, 0.7080) 
Indiana        92    -0.0022 (0.03)  (-0.1664, 0.1618)  -0.3293 (3.18)*  (-0.5362, -0.1223)   0.1604 (0.74)  (-0.2726, 0.5936) 
Iowa        99     0.1754 (2.00)**  (0.0006, 0.3502)  -0.0233 (0.48)  (-0.1197, 0.0730)   0.2594 (1.46)  (-0.0948, 0.6137) 
Kansas        106     0.0736 (1.21)  (-0.0475, 0.1948)  -0.0162 (0.43)  (-0.0923, 0.0597)   0.0679 (0.63)  (-0.1477, 0.2836) 
Kentucky        120    -0.0762 (1.17)  (-0.2054, 0.0528)   0.0254 (0.39)  (-0.1036, 0.1544)   0.1347 (0.90)  (-0.1622, 0.4316) 
Louisiana        64    -0.4473 (3.39)*  (-0.7167, -0.1778)   0.0084 (0.10)  (-0.1619, 0.1787)   0.4228 (1.86)***  (-0.0406, 0.8864) 
Michigan     83     0.1029  (1.01)  (-0.1025,  0.3084)  -0.0243  (0.23)  (-0.2397,  0.1910)  -0.2559  (1.24)  (-0.6713,  0.1594) 
Minnesota     87     0.0091  (0.10)  (-0.1653,  0.1835)  -0.0878  (1.40)  (-0.2139,  0.0382)  -0.0524  (0.29)  (-0.4202,  0.3153) 
Mississippi      82     0.1244 (0.70)  (-0.2349, 0.4838)  -0.2426 (1.92)***  (-0.4973, 0.0119)   1.1467 (3.18)*  (0.4218, 1.8716) 
Missouri     115   -0.0002  (0.01)  (-0.1286,  0.1282)    0.0243  (0.39)  (-0.1001,  0.1487)  -0.1223  (0.67)  (-0.4839,  0.2392) 
Montana        56     0.1345 (1.13)  (-0.1123, 0.3813)  -0.0476 (0.66)  (-0.1962, 0.1009)   0.2268 (1.27)  (-0.1413, 0.5949) 
New York       62     0.0759 (0.77)  (-0.1264, 0.2783)  -0.0830 (0.51)  (-0.4161, 0.2499)   0.7624 (2.40)**  ( 0.1129, 1.4120) 
North Carolina      100    -0.0858 (0.79)  (-0.3040, 0.1322)   0.0923 (0.84)  (-0.1274, 0.3121)   0.1475 (0.81)  (-0.2159, 0.5108) 
North Dakota      53     0.7250 (3.57)*  ( 0.3014, 1.1485)   0.0900 (0.60)  (-0.2223, 04023)   0.7627 (3.37)*  ( 0.2908, 1.2347) 
Ohio        88    -0.0284 (0.28)  (-0.2324, 0.1756)   0.0345 (0.35)  (-0.1611, 0.2303)   0.2109 (0.98)  (-0.2194, 0.6413) 
Oklahoma     77   -0.0913  (1.11)  (-0,2578,  0.0751)    0.0991  (1.24)  (-0.0618,  0.2601)  -0.2212  (1.01)  (-0.6624,  0.2199) 
Pennsylvania      67    -0.0515 (0.53)  (-0.2506, 0.1476)  -0.1111 (0.86)  (-0.3736, 0.1513)   0.3957 (1.12)  (-0.3234, 1.1149) 
South Carolina      46    -0.1886 (0.55)  (-0.9331, 0.5559)   0.1143 (0.32)  (-0.6737, 0.9023)  -0.2122 (0.45)  (-1.2037, 0.8063) 
South Dakota      66     0.0758 (0.72)  (-0.1438, 0.3010)   0.0651 (0.86)  (-0.0887, 0.2189)  -0.1032 (0.56)  (-0.4789, 0.2724)   
Tennessee       97     0.2628 (2.29)**  (0.0337, 0.4921)   0.0989 (0.99)  (-0.1007, 0.2986)  -0.3789 (1.20)   (-1.0087, 0.2509) 
Texas        254     0.1834 (3.27)*  (0.0730, 0.2939)  -0.0347 (0.80)  (-0.1207, 0.0511)   0.0295 (0.23)  (-0.2228, 0.2821) 
Virginia        84     0.1706 (1.39)  (-0.0761, 0.4174)  -0.1852 (1.73)***  (-0.4012, 0.0306)   0.0021 (0.01)  (-0.5651, 0.5694) 
Washington      39    -0.0328 (0.12)  (-0.7212, 0.6555)   0.2860 (1.16)  (-0.3458, 0.9179)  -0.0475 (0.07)  (-1.8441, 1.7489) 
West Virginia      55     0.1316 (0.85)  (-0.1904, 0.4537)  -0.0645 (0.47)  (-0.3495, 0.2203)   0.2850 (1.50)  (-0.1744, 0.3641) 
Wisconsin       70     0.0355 (0.47)  (-0.1195, 0.1907)  -0.0511 (0.58)  (-0.2306, 0.1283)   0.0321 (0.15)  (-0.4187, 0.4835) 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
 
*     significant at 1% level 
**    significant at 5% level 
***   significant at 10% level    35
Figure 1: 
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Referee’s Appendix: Inconsistency of OLS Estimates 
 
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) could be used to infer the values of 
β and γ  in equation (3).  However, Evans (1997b) states that the OLS estimates 
obtained from (3) are unlikely to be consistent.
1  In order to demonstrate this 
inconsistency, Evans first specifies a general autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
data-generating process for  nt y : 
 
(1A)   ∑
=
− − − + − + = −
q
i
i t n ni t t n n n t nt a y a y
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, 1 1 , ) ( ε θ λ δ            
with    
 
(2A)   n n n n x ω ξ κ δ + ′ + =          
 
where  nt ε  is a zero-mean, covariance stationary error process independently distributed 
over time and across economies. The error term,  nt ε , is uncorrelated with  n x ,  n λ  is an 
autoregressive parameter which lies on  ] 1 , 0 ( , and  nq n θ θ ... 0  satisfy the restriction  1 0 = n θ .  
As such,  t nt a y −  will also have an autoregressive representation and will be covariance 
stationary if  n λ <1 or difference stationary if  1 = n λ .  The common time-specific effect 
experienced by every economy is represented by the term  t a .  Evans assumes that  t a ∆  is 
covariance stationary and independent of  nt ε .   
The common trend  t a  for all the  y variables will be the sole catalyst of economic 
growth in all economies if  n λ <1.  In this case, growth is exogenous and economies would 
follow a balanced-growth path.  If  n λ =1, on the other hand, then economy n will grow 
endogenously since  nt y  diverges from  t a  and the  y  variables of all remaining 
economies.  The parameter  n δ  controls for the relative height of economy n’s balanced 
growth path if all the λ s are less than one.  If  1 = n λ , then  n δ  controls for economy n’s 
                                                   
1   This section borrows heavily from Evans (1997b), which can be consulted for further details.    ii
relative growth rate.  The error term  n ω  measures the portion of  n δ  that is not explained 
by  n x .  This error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with  n x .  The inequality  n λ <1 will 
hold for an economy described by the neoclassical growth model.   
  Solving equation (1A) backward from year T to year 0, substituting from equation 
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0 .   If  0 < n β , then economy 
n grows exogenously () 1 < n λ .  On the other hand, if  0 = n β , then economy n grows 
endogenously () 1 = n λ .   
Now consider a special case in which every intercept  n δ  is completely explained 
by the county characteristics included in  n x   ω n = 0,∀ n ()  and every series  t nt a y −  is a 
first-order auto-regression () 0 = q .  Under these restrictions equation (3A) reduces to: 
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x y g ε λ γ β α       
 
The estimator for β ˆ  can then be obtained in two steps.  First, regress  0 n y  on an intercept 
and  n x  to obtain the residual  n r  and then regress  n g  on  n r .  (This is simply the OLS 













ε λ is uncorrelated with the intercept,  n y ,  n x and 
the residual  n r .  As a result, one has 

















































β   
 
Making further assumptions that  n α  is uncorrelated with  n r ,  n β  is uncorrelated with 


































β         
 
The probability limit of the OLS estimator is then a weighted average of the economy 
specific β ns.  It is a consistent estimator of that weighted average.
2 
But what if the assumption that every intercept  n δ  is completely explained by  n x  
and also the assumption that every series  t nt a y −  is a first-order auto-regression, are 
relaxed?  Relaxing these assumptions, and imposing the additional restriction that the 
s λ and  s ξ  and, as a result, the  s β  and  s γ  are identical across all economies (for the 
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2 Strictly speaking, even for this restrictive case, an OLS estimate less than unity does not mean 
that all the economies in the sample conform to the neoclassical growth model. Rather, it would 
mean that enough economies conform, so that the weighted average is less than unity. It would 



































a aT .  Applying the same steps to 
equation (6A) yields 
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As a result, equation (8A) implies that  β ˆ lim
∞ → N
p  differs from β  if either q > 0 (ynt – at is 
not a first-order AR process) or the cross-sectional variance of  n ω  is positive (not all 
cross-sectional heterogeneity is accounted for).  In other words, the OLS estimator is 
inconsistent unless (a) the log of income per capita has an identical first-order AR 
representation across economies, and (b) all cross-section heterogeneity is controlled for.    
Evans shows that the resulting bias from q > 0 is likely to be negligible in practice 
but the bias resulting from a positive cross-sectional variance for  n ω  can be substantial.  
This is essentially an omitted variable bias.  Evans demonstrates that 
 
(9A)   plim
N→∞
ˆ  β  =
var y | x,ω ()









β         
and  
(10A)   plim
N→∞
ˆ  γ  =
var y | x,ω ()









γ .         
 
The bracketed portions in equations (9A) and (10A) are the ratio of the cross-sectional 
variance of  0 n y  conditional on both  n x  and  n ω  to the cross-sectional variance of  0 n y  on   v
n x .  As such, β ˆ  and γ ˆ will be biased towards zero unless the  xs  are able to control for a 
large portion of the cross-economy variation in the  ys. 
  The intuition here is that if a large portion of the growth of per capita income is 
explained by variables left out of the OLS regression, then the estimate of the 
convergence effect will be biased.  In general, omitted variable bias can be either positive 
or negative. However, in this case, theoretically, the bias is negative. Evans (1997b, 
Tables on p. 11 and p. 15) estimates β  for Mankiw, et al.’s (1992) international data using 
both the OLS, which yields inconsistent estimates, and the 2SLS approach (as outlined in 
section 2), which yields consistent estimates of both β  and γ .  He finds that the 2SLS 
estimate implies a conditional convergence rate between 4 to 5 times as large as the OLS 
estimate. The bias produced by the OLS in this case, therefore, is substantial. 
   vi
Referee Appendix Table 1: Entire United States 
 
 
   ___Alabama___ __  Arkansas___ __  California__ ___Colorado__ ____Florida___ 
 
RHS Variables
1   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
Constant       0.0572   0.1399   0.0689   0.1255   0.0573   0.0449   0.1971   0.3827   0.0092   0.1625 
      (0.31) (0.92) (0.48) (0.86) (0.25) (0.21) (1.74)***  (3.25)*  (0.04) (0.74) 
 
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0251 -0.0334 -0.0267 -0.0384 -0.0261 -0.0235 -0.0133 -0.0318 -0.0190 -0.0318 
 income
2     (2.38)** (20.49)* (4.48)*  (22.08)* (2.50)** (4.87)*  (2.53)** (13.41)* (2.06)** (14.98)* 
   
Age: 5-13 years     0.2200   0.1991   0.2602   0.3321   0.1965   0.1819  -0.0602  -0.0538   0.0924   0.0723 
      (1.03) (0.95) (1.33) (1.67)***  (0.69) (0.67) (0.47) (0.36) (0.36) (0.28) 
  
Age: 14-17 years    -0.0369  -0.0617   0.1106   0.1081   0.1049   0.1002  -0.0111  -0.0387   0.1892   0.1257 
      (0.17) (0.29) (0.81) (0.77) (0.42) (0.41) (0.11) (0.33) (0.80) (0.53) 
 
Age: 18-64 years      0.1144    0.0978   0.1522   0.1798   0.1497   0.1393  -0.1682  -0.1779   0.1105   0.0593 
      (0.62) (0.54) (1.20) (1.38) (0.69) (0.66) (1.42) (1.28) (0.51) (0.27) 
 
Age: 65+       0.1441   0.1131   0.1571   0.1740   0.1762   0.1652  -0.0661  -0.0526   0.0873   0.0466 
      (0.89) (0.73) (1.19) (1.28) (0.85) (0.84) (0.78) (0.53) (0.47) (0.25) 
 
Blacks      -0.0233  -0.0264   0.0006   0.0023   0.0035   0.0015  -0.1083  -0.1384   0.0189   0.0207 
      (1.61) (1.89)***  (0.07) (0.27) (0.11) (0.05) (0.94) (1.03) (1.17) (1.26) 
 
Hispanic      -0.0947  -0.2311   0.1775   0.1111   0.0191   0.0193  -0.0005  -0.0007   0.0315   0.0397 
      (0.24) (0.66) (0.67) (0.41) (1.11) (1.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.66) (0.82) 
 
Education: 9-11 years    0.0819   0.0832  -0.0188  -0.0223  -0.0676  -0.0673   0.1037   0.1171  -0.0211  -0.0045 
      (2.03)**  (2.07)**  (0.63) (0.73) (1.00) (1.02) (2.53)**  (2.44)**  (0.35) (0.07) 
 
Education: H.S. diploma   0.0077   0.0832   0.0073   0.0153  -0.0217  -0.0212   0.0226   0.0654   0.0614   0.0649 
      (0.16) (2.07)**  (0.24) (0.49) (0.60) (0.60) (0.81) (2.23)**  (0.91) (0.95) 
 
Education: Some college   0.0998   0.1229   0.0355   0.0492   0.0494   0.0513   0.1039   0.0600   0.1688   0.1813 
      (1.08) (1.41) (0.56) (0.75) (0.72) (0.77) (1.78)***  (0.90) (1.59) (1.69)*** 
 
Education: Bachelor +   0.0415   0.0448   0.1025   0.1188   0.1063   0.1003   0.0621   0.1178   0.0534   0.1094 
      (0.70) (0.77) (1.39) (1.56) (2.14)**  (2.36)**  (1.69)***  (3.03)*  (0.57) (1.28) 
 
Housing       0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   -0.0000   0.0000 
      (0.39) (0.66) (0.47) (0.52) (0.63) (0.68) (1.93)***  (2.06)**  (0.15) (0.11) 
 
Federal government     0.0232   0.0391  -0.0060  -0.0142   0.0357   0.0352  -0.0207  -0.0609   0.0471   0.0280 
  employment    (0.40) (0.72) (0.13) (0.29) (1.22) (1.23) (0.61) (1.69)***  (0.64) (0.38) 
 
State  government      -0.0129 -0.0131 -0.0220 -0.0408   0.0350   0.0331 -0.0223 -0.0605   0.0122   0.0049 
  employment    (0.27) (0.27) (0.61) (1.13) (0.86) (0.84) (0.60) (1.66)***  (0.22) (0.09) 
 
Local government     0.0348   0.0379  -0.0443  -0.0392   0.0506   0.0462  -0.0043  -0.0215  -0.0438  -0.0244 
  employment    (0.64) (0.71) (1.05) (0.90) (0.75) (0.72) (0.14) (0.61) (0.51) (0.28) 
 
Self-employment    -0.0512 -0.0622   0.0045   0.0019 -0.0404 -0.0364   0.0286 -0.0032   0.0673   0.0721 
      (1.11) (1.43) (0.16) (0.07) (0.66) (0.63) (0.93) (0.09) (1.43) (1.51) 
 
Agriculture     0.0725   0.0881   0.0285  0.0578   0.0350   0.0295   0.0001   0.0193   0.0431   0.0491 
      (0.96) (1.22) (0.44) (0.88) (0.82) (0.83) (0.01) (0.38) (0.54) (0.61) 
 
Communications    -0.0803 -0.0846 -0.0022   0.0216 -0.0298 -0.0295 -0.1039 -0.1122 -0.1259 -0.1377 
      (1.37) (1.45) (0.02) (0.23) (0.44) (0.44) (1.45) (1.33) (1.13) (1.22) 
 
Construction     0.0927    0.1140   0.0737   0.0924   0.1033   0.1032  -0.0091  -0.0268   0.0951   0.1095 
      (1.17) (1.54) (1.22) (1.50) (2.28)**  (2.32)**  (0.22) (0.57) (1.38) (1.85)*** 
 
Finance, insurance     0.2331   0.2583   0.0273   0.0464   0.0947   0.0899   0.1735   0.1091   0.0652   0.0561 
  &  real  estate    (1.58) (1.80)***  (0.26) (0.43) (1.10) (1.10) (1.98)**  (2.08)**  (0.56) (0.48) 
 
Manufacturing –      0.0451   0.0551   0.0424   0.0607   0.0442   0.0426   0.0060  -0.0204   0.0647   0.0660 
  durables      (0.74) (0.92) (0.68) (0.95) (1.35) (1.36) (0.13) (0.37) (0.86) (0.87) 
 
                                                   
1  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970. 
2  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.    vii
 





   ___Alabama___ __  Arkansas___ __  California__ ___Colorado__ ____Florida___ 
 
RHS Variables
3   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
 
Manufacturing –       0.0477   0.0594   0.0445   0.0617   0.0851    0.0832  -0.0926  -0.0851   0.0697   0.0739 
  nondurables      (0.75) (0.96) (0.72) (0.97) (2.05)**  (2.08)**  (1.70)***  (1.33) (0.98) (1.02) 
 
Mining       0.0945   0.1113  -0.0082   0.0177   0.0531   0.0540  -0.0027  -0.0318   0.0115   0.0105 
      (0.92) (1.12) (0.11) (0.22) (0.88) (0.91) (0.07) (0.70) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
Retail       0.0161   0.0255  -0.0256  -0.0014   0.1063   0.1019   0.0072  -0.0202  -0.0001  -0.0241 
      (0.19) (0.31) (0.37) (0.02) (1.68)***  (1.71)***  (0.119)  (0.46) (0.001)  (0.25) 
 
Business & repair     0.0854   0.0831    0.2275   0.2698   0.0763   0.0651  -0.1038  -0.0687  -0.3463  -0.3845 
  services          (0.50) (0.49) (2.28)**  (2.68)*  (0.46) (0.41) (1.10) (0.62) (2.11)**  (2.34)** 
 
Educational services    -0.1244  -0.1639   0.1019   0.1168   0.0385   0.0332   0.0820   0.0650  -0.3053  -0.4116 
      (0.68) (0.94) (1.37) (1.52) (0.32) (0.29) (1.42) (0.96) (1.44) (2.04)** 
 
Professional  related      0.1624   0.1957 -0.0747 -0.0745 -0.0648 -0.0572 -0.0135 -0.0169   0.2905   0.3612 
  services        (0.94) (1.17) (0.93) (0.90) (0.58) (0.55) (0.22) (0.23) (1.61) (2.05)** 
 
Health services    -0.1808  -0.2076   0.1435   0.1639   0.1877   0.1793   0.0233   0.0409  -0.2749  -0.3446 
      (1.03) (1.21) (1.78)***  (1.98)**  (1.52) (1.54) (0.42) (0.64) (1.34) (1.70)*** 
 
Personal services     0.1529   0.1979   0.1047   0.1456   0.0296   0.0251   0.0734   0.0555   0.1202   0.1576 
(1.30) (1.93)***  (1.44) (2.02)**  (0.62) (0.58) (1.27) (0.82) (1.13) (1.51) 
 
Entertainment &     -0.0811  -0.0954  -0.1331  -0.0676   0.1523   0.1498   0.0301   0.0928   0.1176   0.1005 
  recreational  services    (0.27) (0.32) (0.76) (0.38) (2.28)**  (2.31)**  (0.36) (0.96) (0.46) (0.39) 
 
Transportation     0.0508   0.0688   0.0529   0.0673   0.1377   0.1322   0.0421  -0.0082   0.1414   0.1635 
      (0.66) (0.94) (0.76) (0.94) (2.32)**  (2.46)**  (0.73) (0.12) (1.36) (1.57) 
 
Wholesale trade     0.0089    0.0241   0.0729   0.0851   0.0831   0.0781  -0.0577  -0.1034   0.0357   0.0159 
      (0.09) (0.26) (0.79) (0.89) (1.06) (1.05) (0.72) (1.11) (0.37) (0.17) 
 
Poverty     -0.0032 -0.0126 -0.0257 -0.0432 -0.0968 -0.0876 -0.0262   -0.0607  -0.0094 -0.0329 
      (0.09) (0.39) (1.16) (2.05)**  (1.41) (1.55) (1.13) (2.45)**  (0.25) (0.95) 
 
Metro area, 1970    -0.0002  -0.0003   0.0013   0.0023   0.0011   0.0009  -0.0007  -0.0008   0.0059   0.0065 
      (0.10) (0.15) (0.66) (1.13) (0.50) (0.45) (0.40) (0.38) (2.50)**  (2.78)* 
 
Adjusted R
2     0.07 0.69 0.39 0.72 0.79 0.89 0.67 0.79 0.28 0.73 
#  Observations    64 64 74 74 58 58 63 63 67 67 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
 
*      significant at 1% level 
**    significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
                                                   
3  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.     viii




   __  _Georgia___ __  _Idaho___  __    Illinois___  __    Indiana_  _  ___   Iowa_     _  
 
RHS Variables
4   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS    
 
Constant       0.0174   0.4666   0.4294   0.4303   0.2753   0.3083   0.1449   0.3661   0.0239    0.0247   
      (2.11)** (7.37)*  (2.41)** (2.81)** (2.62)** (3.59)*  (1.18)  (3.00)*  (0.21)  (0.23)   
  
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0171 -0.0367 -0.0403 -0.0405 -0.0255 -0.0281 -0.0061 -0.0299 -0.0288 -0.0289  
 income
5      (4.33)* (36.46)*  (2.23)**  (10.03)*  (5.46)* (9.07)* (1.02)  (9.25)* (5.65)* (4.75)*  
    
Age: 5-13 years     -0.0867  -0.1559   0.1599   0.1614   0.0036  -0.0052    0.1574   0.0439   0.2522   0.2521   
      (1.23) (2.06)**  (0.73) (0.93) (0.03) (0.04) (1.22) (0.31) (1.95)***  (1.96)**   
 
Age: 14-17 years    -0.0853  -0.1866   0.0131   0.0143  -0.0231  -0.0345   0.0671   0.0245   0.1254   0.1256    
      (1.09) (2.26)**  (0.06) (0.08) (0.26) (0.41) (0.59) (0.19) (1.24) (1.25)  
  
Age: 18-64 years      -0.0311  -0.1140   0.2249   0.2265  -0.0141  -0.0233   0.0302  -0.0353   0.1469   0.1469   
      (0.56) (1.98)**  (1.32) (2.05)***  (0.15) (0.26) (0.32) (0.34) (1.69)***  (1.70)***   
  
Age: 65+       0.0154  -0.0573   0.0900   0.0912  -0.0939  -0.1016   0.0689  -0.0281   0.1092   0.1091   
      (0.30) (1.08) (0.59) (0.79) (1.12) (1.23) (0.78) (0.30) (1.19) (1.20)  
 
Blacks        -0.0020  -0.0055 -0.1843 -0.1828 -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0300 -0.0288 -0.1568 -0.1571  
      (0.38) (1.03) (0.70) (0.83) (0.38) (0.41) (0.80) (0.69) (1.97)***  (2.01)**   
 
Hispanic      -0.0184  -0.1481   0.0102   0.0105  -0.0052  -0.0018   0.0201   0.0393   0.1651   0.1652   
      (0.14) (1.07) (0.15) (0.18) (0.10) (0.04) (0.28) (0.49) (1.62) (1.64)  
 
Education:  9-11  years    -0.0094   0.0087   0.0609   0.0612 -0.0592 -0.0587 -0.0463 -0.0333 -0.0314 -0.0314  
      (0.67) (0.58) (0.82) (0.93) (3.22)*  (3.22)*  (2.02)**  (1.31) (1.26) (1.28)  
   
Education:  H.S.  diploma    0.0028   0.0103   0.0893   0.0893 -0.0166 -0.0149 -0.0441 -0.0220 -0.0003 -0.0003  
      (0.18) (0.60) (2.16)***  (2.31)**  (1.47) (1.38) (2.85)*  (1.37) (0.03) (0.03)  
 
Education: Some college   0.0793   0.0715  -0.0053  -0.0052   0.0255   0.0280   0.1167   0.1129   0.0155   0.0157   
      (2.14)**  (1.77)***  (0.10) (0.11) (0.80) (0.89) (2.41)**  (2.09)**  (0.56) (0.58)  
 
Education: Bachelor +   0.0031   0.0279   0.0643   0.0656   0.0449   0.0495  -0.0369   0.0406  -0.0368  -0.0369   
      (0.11) (0.90) (0.44) (0.65) (1.40) (1.61) (0.76) (0.82) (1.19) (1.20)  
 
Housing       0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000  -0.000   0.0000   0.0000   
      (1.04) (2.03)**  (0.35) (0.37) (0.17) (0.24) (0.78) (0.52) (2.52)**  (2.57)**   
 
Federal government     0.0166  -0.0100  -0.1098   -0.1102  0.0409   0.0405  -0.0607  -0.0968   0.0540   0.0541   
  employment    (0.50) (0.28) (1.60) (1.94)***  (1.24) (1.24) (1.16) (2.03)**  (1.42) (1.43)  
 
State government      0.0197   0.0035   0.0360   0.0364  -0.0087  -0.0095   0.0239  -0.0043   0.0456  -0.0457    
  employment    (0.90) (0.15) (0.79) (1.10) (0.46) (0.51) (1.05) (0.18) (2.30)**  (2.32)**   
 
Local government     0.0377   0.0144   0.0272   0.0280  -0.0047  -0.0009  -0.0474  -0.0319   0.0134   0.0135   
  employment    (1.34) (0.48) (0.28) (0.41) (0.02) (0.04) (1.43) (0.87) (0.49) (0.51)  
 
Self-employment    -0.0260 -0.0244 -0.0440 -0.0443   0.0161   0.0109 -0.0590 -0.0456 -0.0079 -0.0079  
      (1.36) (1.17) (1.23) (1.67) (0.60) (0.44) (1.79)***  (1.24) (0.37) (0.38)  
 
Agriculture     0.0618   0.0163  -0.2151  -0.2151   0.0122   0.0169  -0.0782  -0.0291   0.1196    0.1197   
      (1.69)***  (0.42) (1.96)***  (2.06)***  (0.31) (0.44) (1.45) (0.49) (1.89)***  (1.92)***   
 
Communications     0.0277   0.0095  -0.0983  -0.1000   0.0355   0.0403  -0.1097  -0.0293   0.1784   0.1785   
      (0.49) (0.16) (0.52) (0.79) (0.58) (0.67) (1.69)***  (0.43) (2.12)**  (2.14)**   
 
Construction      0.0839   0.0167 -0.3323 -0.3324 -0.0202 -0.0239 -0.1011 -0.0369   0.0659   0.0679  
      (2.23)**  (0.44) (2.58)**  (2.74)**  (0.50) (0.60) (1.51) (0.51) (0.95) (0.98)  
  
Finance, insurance    -0.0548   -0.0697   -0.3769  -0.3772  0.1020   0.1018  -0.0705  -0.0022   0.1752   0.1754   
  &  real  estate    (0.77) (0.90) (2.20)***  (2.34)**  (2.21)**  (2.21)**  (0.94) (0.03) (1.97)***  (2.00)**   
 
Manufacturing –      0.0445  -0.0068   -0.2636  -0.2638  0.0088   0.0078  -0.1054  -0.0513   0.1265   0.1267    
  durables      (1.22) (0.18) (2.27)**  (2.42)**  (0.26) (0.23) (1.88)***  (0.85) (2.03)**  (2.06)**   
                                                   
4  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970. 
5  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.      ix
 
 





   __  _Georgia___ __  _Idaho___  __    Illinois___  __    Indiana_  _  ___   Iowa_     _  
 
RHS Variables
6   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS    
 
 
Manufacturing –       0.0315  -0.0102  -0.2664  -0.2665   0.0004   0.0036  -0.1024  -0.0513   0.1105   0.1107   
  nondurables      (0.88) (0.27) (2.30)**  (2.44)**  (0.14) (0.11) (1.85)***  (0.85) (1.69)***  (1.70)***   
 
Mining       0.0510   0.0023 -0.2809 -0.2812 -0.0068 -0.0058 -0.0907 -0.0356   0.1775   0.1778  
      (1.38) (0.06) (2.38)**  (2.57)**  (0.19) (0.16) (1.36) (0.49) (1.48) (1.50)  
 
Retail        0.0325 -0.0210 -0.2952 -0.2954 -0.0042 -0.0072 -0.1465 -0.0818   0.1393   0.1395  
      (0.86) (0.53) (2.54)**  (2.71)**  (0.12) (0.20) (2.27)**  (1.17) (2.10)**  (2.15)**   
 
Business & repair     0.2161    0.1994  -0.2389  -0.2396   0.0724   0.0748  -0.2757  -0.2109   0.0557   0.0554   
  services          (2.94)*  (2.49)**  (1.68) (1.93)***  (1.04) (1.08) (2.34)**  (1.62) (0.60) (0.60)  
 
Educational  services      0.0562   0.0588 -0.2809 -0.2826 -0.1155 -0.1139 -0.2513 -0.3292 -0.0233 -0.0233    
      (0.91) (0.87) (1.35) (1.88)***  (1.69)***  (1.70)***  (2.66)*  (3.18)*  (0.48) (0.48)  
 
Professional related    -0.0525  -0.0942  -0.0891  -0.0889   0.0644   0.0589   0.1320   0.2176   0.1294   0.1295   
  services        (0.84) (1.39) (0.55) (0.58) (0.81) (0.75) (1.24) (1.86)***  (1.72)***  (1.73)***   
 
Health  services      0.0587   0.0697   0.0856   0.0845 -0.1022 -0.0986 -0.2816 -0.3060 -0.0308 -0.0307  
      (0.96) (1.04) (0.48) (0.56) (1.39) (1.36) (2.98)*  (2.91)*  (0.58) (0.58)  
 
Personal services     0.0652   0.0293  -0.1934  -0.1936   0.0641   0.0736  -0.0193   0.0278   0.1776   0.1777   
(1.44) (0.60) (1.71) (1.85)***  (0.86) (1.02) (0.30) (0.39) (2.06)**  (2.08)**   
 
Entertainment &      0.1824   0.2271  -0.2449  -0.2443   0.3805   0.3781   0.0797   0.1604   0.2593   0.2594   
  recreational  services    (1.48) (1.69)***  (0.75) (0.79) (2.29)**  (2.29)**  (0.41) (0.74) (1.45) (1.46)  
  
Transportation      0.0222 -0.1591 -0.2889 -0.2896 -0.0339 -0.0352 -0.1411 -0.0825   0.0548   0.0548  
      (0.53) (0.35) (2.30)**  (2.65)**  (0.84) (0.88) (2.17)**  (1.16) (0.81) (0.81)  
  
Wholesale trade     0.0878    0.0376  -0.2639  -0.2638   0.0060   0.0074   0.0271   0.0658   0.1139   0.1141   
      (1.75)***  (0.70) (1.82) (1.92)***  (0.11) (0.14) (0.40) (0.89) (1.66) (1.69)***   
  
Poverty     -0.0227 -0.0364 -0.0098 -0.0104 -0.0274 -0.0319 -0.0252 -0.0341 -0.0444 -0.0446  
      (1.78)***  (2.69)*  (0.14) (0.21) (1.36) (1.73)***  (0.97) (1.17) (2.25)**  (2.64)**   
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0028   0.0038  -0.0071  -0.0071   0.0013   0.0015   0.0004   0.0005    0.0009   0.0009  
      (2.52)**  (3.21)*  (1.42) (1.59) (1.55) (1.75)***  (0.48) (0.52) (0.79) (0.79)  
 
R
2      0.50   0.72  0.94  0.94   0.72   0.88    0.73   0.80   0.65   0.73   
Adjusted R
2       0.37   0.65  0.72  0.77   0.59   0.82   0.57   0.69   0.47   0.60    
# Observations     160   160  44  44   102   102   92   92   99   99 
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
                                                   
6  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   x




   ____Kansas  ___ ___Kentucky__ ___Louisiana__ __    Michigan__ __  Minnesota___  
 
RHS Variables
7   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
Constant       0.2203   0.2332   0.1237   0.2168   0.2631   0.3851   0.0441   0.3368   0.3382   0.3998    
      (2.39)** (2.66)** (1.26)  (2.33)** (3.10)*  (4.39)*  (0.31)  (2.89)*  (2.59)** (3.09)*   
 
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0286 -0.0301 -0.0253 -0.0354 -0.0222 -0.0413 -0.0104 -0.0387 -0.0156 -0.0260  
 income
8      (9.76)* (12.18)*  (6.11)* (19.74)*  (3.83)* (13.83)*  (1.36)  (16.52)*  (2.85)* (9.34)*  
   
Age: 5-13 years     0.0541   0.0547    0.2152   0.2404   0.3058   0.3645   0.0862  -0.0501  -0.1234  -0.1267   
      (0.70) (0.71) (1.71)**  (1.86)***  (2.39)*  (2.50)**  (0.56) (0.30) (0.77) (0.77)  
  
Age: 14-17 years     0.0873   0.0887   0.0035  -0.0074  -0.1683  -0.1097   0.1633   0.1337  -0.0540  -0.0419   
      (0.96) (0.98) (0.04) (0.08) (1.67) (0.97) (1.29) (0.94) (0.43) (0.33)  
  
Age: 18-64 years      0.0189   0.0186   0.0815   0.0919   0.0532   0.0831   0.0831   0.0101  -0.0683  -0.0843   
      (0.28) (0.27) (0.97) (1.06) (0.70) (0.96) (0.77) (0.09) (0.61) (0.74)  
 
Age: 65+       0.0000   -0.0036   0.0908   0.1066   0.0651   0.1016   0.0564  -0.0492  -0.1243  -0.1259   
      (0.01) (0.06) (1.09) (1.25) (0.86) (1.17) (0.50) (0.40) (1.20) (1.19)  
  
Blacks      -0.0528 -0.0527 -0.0061    -0.0058 -0.0007   0.0042 -0.0385 -0.0260 -0.1293 -0.0966  
      (2.28)**  (2.29)**  (0.43) (0.40) (0.10) (0.51) (2.10)**  (1.29) (0.57) (0.42)  
 
Hispanic        0.0082   0.0087 -0.1829 -0.1893 -0.0171 -0.0318 -0.0926 -0.0214 -0.2423 -0.2401  
      (0.32) (0.34) (0.99) (1.00) (0.38) (0.62) (1.31) (0.28) (1.95)***  (1.89)***   
  
Education: 9-11 years   -0.0295  -0.0281    0.0129   0.0140   0.0051   0.0188  -0.0456  -0.0428  -0.0037  -0.0142   
      (1.39) (1.34) (0.48) (0.51) (0.22) (0.73) (1.61) (1.34) (0.11) (0.43)  
 
Education: H.S. diploma   0.0552   0.0556   0.0472   0.0562  -0.0198  -0.0178  -0.0283  -0.0187   0.0024   0.0053   
      (4.42)*  (4.49)*    (2.60)**  (3.07)*  (1.11) (0.86) (1.30) (0.77) (0.14) (0.31)  
 
Education: Some college  -0.0061  -0.0031   0.0647   0.0769   0.0245   0.0717  -0.0338  -0.0079   00313   0.0441   
      (0.30) (0.16) (1.52) (1.77)**  (0.45) (1.19) (0.72) (0.15) (0.87) (1.23)  
  
Education: Bachelor +   0.0380   0.0403   0.0483   0.0711   0.0633   0.0707   0.0258   0.0873   0.02331   0.0273   
      (1.42) (1.54) (1.06) (1.55) (1.22) (1.19) (0.72) (2.44)**  (0.56) (0.64)  
 
Housing       0.0000   0.0000    0.0000   0.000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
      (1.25) (1.25) (0.51) (0.69) (0.34) (1.17) (0.37) (0.49) (1.32) (1.43)  
 
Federal  government      0.0256   0.0253 -0.0105 -0.0192 -0.0479 -0.0252   0.0389   0.0716 -0.0618 -0.0371    
  employment    (0.64) (0.64)    (0.47) (1.85)***  (1.56) (1.73)***  (0.87) (1.45) (1.02) (0.61)  
 
State  government        0.0116   0.0108   0.0058 -0.0041 -0.0073 -0.0160 -0.0299 -0.0631   0.0010 -0.0108  
  employment    (0.71) (0.67) (0.29) (0.20) (0.03) (0.49) (1.17) (2.33)**  (0.04) (0.47)  
 
Local  government      0.0169   0.0179   0.0001 -0.0078 -0.1306 -0.1652 -0.0062 -0.0332 -0.0253 -0.0246  
  employment    (1.00) (1.07) (0.01) (0.30) (2.53)**  (2.85)*  (0.20) (0.97) (1.09) (1.03)  
 
Self-employment    -0.0376 -0.0369 -0.0190 -0.0219   0.0587   0.0583   -0.0643 -0.0532   0.0224   0.0137  
      (2.19)**  (2.17)**  (0.79) (0.89) (1.95)***  (1.68) (1.42) (1.05) (0.92) (0.56)  
 
Agriculture     0.0461   0.0468   0.0291   0.0219  -0.1529  -0.1238   0.0617   0.0621  -0.1210  -0.0637   
      (0.79) (0.81) (0.84) (0.62) (2.90)*  (2.07)**  (0.97) (0.87) (1.68)***  (0.95)  
  
Communications     0.0204   0.0209   0.0224   0.0146  -0.0201   0.0576   0.0027   0.0159  -0.0950  -0.0767   
      (0.38) (0.39) (0.54) (0.34) (0.29) (0.77) (0.04) (0.19) (1.24) (0.99)  
 
Construction    -0.0304 -0.0301   0.0248   0.0117 -0.1035 -0.0913   0.0357   0.0565 -0.0362   0.0075  
      (0.58) (0.60) (0.72) (0.34) (1.88)***  (1.44) (0.62) (0.88) (0.45) (0.09)  
 
Finance, insurance     0.0731   0.0736   -0.0642   -0.0762  -0.3863  -0.4473   0.0735   0.1029  -0.0721   0.0091   
  &  real  estate    (1.19) (1.21) (1.01) (1.17) (3.32)*  (3.39)*  (0.80) (1.01) (0.76) (0.10)  
 
Manufacturing –      0.0231   0.0226   0.0118  -0.0036  -0.1118  -0.0982   0.0126   0.0239  -0.0880  -0.0483   
  durables      (0.46) (0.45) (0.39) (0.12) (2.32)**  (1.78)***  (0.29) (0.49) (1.32) (0.75)  
                                                   
7  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.  
8  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.    xi
 
 




   ____Kansas  ___ ___Kentucky__ ___Louisiana__ __    Michigan__ __  Minnesota___  
 
RHS Variables
9   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS    
 
 
Manufacturing  –          0.0165   0.0165   0.0115 -0.0082 -0.1029 -0.0885 -0.0027   0.0015 -0.1100 -0.0640  
  nondurables      (0.29) (0.29) (0.37) (0.26) (2.11)**  (1.58) (0.06) (0.03) (1.59) (0.96)  
 
Mining     -0.0047 -0.0051   0.0086   0.0019 -0.1459 -0.1385 -0.0202 -0.0139 -0.1111 -0.0692  
      (0.08) (0.09) (0.29) (0.06) (2.68)**  (2.22)**  (0.45) (0.27) (1.61) (1.03)  
 
Retail        0.0268   0.0263 -0.0017 -0.0087 -0.1666 -0.1539 -0.0066   0.0101 -0.1072 -0.0613  
      (0.45) (0.44) (0.04) (0.22) (3.00)*  (2.42)**  (0.13) (0.18) (1.38) (0.81)  
 
Business & repair    -0.0171  -0.0131    0.0143   0.0082  -0.1088  -0.1464   0.2241   0.3661  -0.1243  -0.0854   
  services          (0.21) (0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (1.12) (1.32) (1.63) (2.47)**  (1.23) (0.84)  
 
Educational  services    -0.0162 -0.0162   0.0528   0.0254   0.0856   0.0083 -0.0307 -0.0243 -0.0372 -0.0878  
        (0.42) (0.43) (0.82) (0.39) (1.12) (0.10) (0.32) (0.23) (0.56) (1.40)  
 
Professional related     0.0232   0.0218  -0.0444  -0.0443  -0.1746  -0.0861   0.0544   0.0353  -0.0873   0.0034   
  services        (0.33) (0.32) (0.75) (0.73) (2.11)**  (0.96) (0.59) (0.34) (0.91) (0.04)  
 
Health  services    -0.0093 -0.0062   0.0931   0.0724   0.0766 -0.0051 -0.0245   0.0150 -0.0208 -0.0731  
      (0.24) (0.16) (1.43) (1.09) (0.94) (0.06) (0.26) (0.14) (0.32) (1.22)  
 
Personal  services    -0.0797 -0.0778   0.0741   0.0575 -0.0306 -0.0464   0.0471   0.0406 -0.1028 -0.0411  
(1.14) (1.12)    (1.43) (1.09) (0.46) (0.61) (0.72) (0.55) (1.19) (0.50)  
 
Entertainment &      0.0745   0.0679   0.1546   0.1347   0.1707   0.4228  -0.2251  -0.2559  -0.0978  -0.0524   
  recreational  services    (0.68) (0.63) (1.06) (0.90) (0.81) (1.86)***  (1.22) (1.24) (0.54) (0.29)  
 
Transportation      0.0188   0.0193   0.0054 -0.0161 -0.1215 -0.0675 -0.0009   0.0047 -0.1254 -0.0836  
      (0.30) (0.31) (0.15) (0.45) (1.83)***  (0.91  (0.02) (0.07) (1.40) (0.94)  
 
Wholesale trade     0.0827   0.0821   0.0060  -0.0038   0.0400   0.0504   0.0398   0.0382  -0.1204  -0.0703   
      (1.26) (1.26) (0.11) (0.07) (0.60) (0.65) (0.70) (0.60) (1.64) (1.00)  
 
Poverty       0.0072   0.0127 -0.0111 -0.0234 -0.0355 -0.0661 -0.0594 -0.0931 -0.0106 -0.0457  
      (0.57) (0.54) (0.95) (2.14)**  (2.02)***  (3.84)*  (1.58) (2.27)**  (0.39) (2.20)**   
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0013   0.0013   0.0055   0.0057   0.0003   0.0008   0.0008   0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0003   
      (1.00) (0.98) (3.28)*  (3.29)*  (0.34) (0.76) (0.48) (0.57) (0.10) (0.27)  
 
R
2     0.81   0.78  0.57 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.61 0.87 0.67 0.80  
Adjusted R
2     0.72   0.69  0.40 0.85 0.70 0.90 0.34 0.81 0.46 0.68  
#  Observations    106    106  120  120  64 64 83 83 87 87 
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
                                                   
9  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   xii




   __  Mississippi__ ___  Missouri___  __   Montana_ _ ___New  York__ _North  Carolina_ 
 
RHS Variables
10   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
Constant       0.3108   0.5456   0.1385   0.4189   0.0770   0.2209   0.0129   0.0716   0.3527   0.6585 
      (1.82)***  (3.33)*  (1.60) (4.66)*  (0.41) (1.35) (1.24) (0.41) (3.45)*  (6.16)* 
 
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0182 -0.0448 -0.0171 -0.0455 -0.0229 -0.0328   0.0129 -0.0264 -0.0171 -0.0467 
 income
11      (2.05)**  (13.49)*  (3.78)* (10.74)*  (3.31)* (9.14)* (1.24)  (7.78)* (3.32)* (7.11)* 
 
Age: 5-13 years    -0.1034  -0.0081   0.1141   0.1323   0.1859   0.1378  -0.0210   0.2068  -0.1296  -0.1172 
      (0.62) (0.05) (1.09) (1.04) (1.09) (0.80) (0.08) (0.69) (1.26) (0.93) 
 
Age: 14-17 years    -0.1236  -0.1694   0.0695   0.1422   0.0185  -0.0352  -0.0669   0.0732  -0.2237  -0.2487 
      (0.88) (1.12) (0.84) (1.42) (0.09) (0.18) (0.42) (0.39) (2.31)**  (2.11)** 
 
Age: 18-64 years      -0.1050  -0.0491   0.0859   0.1029   0.1622   0.1079  -0.0683   0.1155  -0.0249   0.0062 
      (1.00) (0.44) (1.12) (1.10) (0.85) (0.57) (0.44) (0.65) (0.32) (0.07) 
 
Age: 65+      -0.1743  -0.1724   0.0287   0.0133   0.1538   0.0914  -0.0793   0.1127   0.0087   0.0106 
      (1.60) (1.47) (0.40) (0.15) (1.10) (0.67) (0.39) (0.47) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
Blacks      -0.0114 -0.0154   0.0057   0.0255 -0.1714 -0.2622 -0.0402 -0.0119   0.0041   0.0135 
      (1.00) (1.26) (0.53) (2.01)**  (0.37) (0.56) (0.84) (0.21) (0.68) (1.91)*** 
  
Hispanic      -0.2929 -0.4960 -0.0826 -0.2560 -0.0150   0.0068 -0.0480 -0.0576 -0.0046   0.0725 
      (1.07) (1.73)***  (0.67) (1.74)***  (0.11) (0.05) (1.11) (1.10) (0.03) (0.38) 
 
Education: 9-11 years   -0.000   0.0095  -0.0121  -0.0226  -0.1061  -0.1081   0.0273   0.0306   0.0220   0.0395 
      (0.01) (0.30) (0.54) (0.83) (1.55) (1.54) (0.74) (0.68) (1.24) (1.85)*** 
 
Education:  H.S.  diploma  -0.0779 -0.0950 -0.0143   0.0187 -0.0241 -0.0028 -0.0368 -0.0719   0.0077   0.0223 
      (1.96)***  (2.24)**  (0.96) (1.11) (0.58) (0.07) (0.91) (1.51) (0.45) (1.07) 
 
Education: Some college   0.0255  -0.0352  -0.0082  -0.0271  -0.0011   0.0100   0.0129   0.0193   0.0213  -0.0162 
      (0.42) (0.57) (0.26) (0.71) (0.03) (0.24) (0.21) (0.26) (0.53) (0.34) 
 
Education: Bachelor +  -0.0678   0.0182   0.0635   0.1255  -0.0061   0.0085   0.0735   0.1734   0.0449   0.1134 
      (0.92) (0.25) (2.04)**  (3.50)*  (0.12) (0.17) (1.45) (3.31)*  (1.36) (3.02)* 
 
Housing      -0.0000 -0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000   0.0000 
      (1.47) (1.06) (0.10) (1.01) (0.73) (0.40) (0.24) (0.36) (0.85) (0.18) 
 
Federal government     0.0427   0.0127  -0.0559  -0.0917  -0.0603  -0.0854   0.0442   0.0966  -0.0978  -0.1674 
  employment    (0.75) (0.21) (2.12)**  (2.94)*  (0.95) (1.37) (0.44) (0.80) (2.11)**  (3.06)* 
  
State government      0.0181  -0.0396  -0.0264  -0.0655   0.0254  -0.0057   0.0245   0.0531  -0.0154  -0.0432 
  Employment    (0.38) (0.84) (1.29) (2.77)*  (0.56) (0.14) (0.65) (1.19) (0.75) (1.78)*** 
  
Local  government    -0.0718 -0.1485 -0.0236 -0.0205 -0.0107 -0.0132   0.0022   0.0072   0.0148 -0.0038 
  employment    (1.19) (2.51)**  (0.99) (0.70) (0.26) (0.32) (0.04) (0.11) (0.34) (0.07) 
 
Self-employment     0.0848   0.0851  -0.0031  -0.0218   0.0163   0.0132   0.0105    0.0009  -0.0103  -0.0172 
      (2.51)**  (2.33)**  (0.17) (1.00) (0.50) (0.39) (0.21) (0.01) (0.37) (0.51) 
 
Agriculture    -0.0431 -0.0716 -0.0292 -0.0447   0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0075   0.0571 -0.1168 -0.1372 
      (0.40) (0.61) (0.87) (1.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.57) (2.06) (1.98)*** 
  
Communications    -0.1040 -0.1188 -0.1179 -0.1158   0.1099   0.0782   0.0168   0.0992 -0.0812 -0.1256 
      (0.72) (0.77) (2.05)**  (1.65)***  (1.41) (1.02) (0.14) (0.67) (1.27) (1.62) 
 
Construction    -0.0063 -0.0109 -0.0074 -0.0254   0.0727   0.0611   0.0808   0.1264 -0.1420 -0.1908 
      (0.06) (0.10) (0.20) (0.57) (1.46) (1.22) (1.03) (1.34) (2.68)*  (2.99)* 
 
Finance, insurance      0.1737   0.1244   0.0005  -0.0001   0.1315   0.1345   0.0038   0.0759  -0.0386  -0.0858 
  &  real  estate    (1.05) (0.70) (0.01) (0.01) (1.13) (1.13) (0.05) (0.77) (0.43) (0.79) 
 
Manufacturing  –      -0.0081 -0.0392 -0.0370 -0.0827   0.0328   0.0178   0.0164   0.0631 -0.1194 -0.1752 
  durables      (0.08) (0.35) (1.20) (2.27)**  (0.77) (0.42) (0.27) (0.87) (2.31)**  (2.84)* 
                                                   
10  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   
11  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.    xiii
 
 




   __  Mississippi__ ___  Missouri___  __   Montana_ _ ___New  York__ _North  Carolina_ 
 
RHS Variables
12   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
 
Manufacturing  –        -0.0246 -0.0661 -0.0391 -0.0699 -0.0120 -0.0155   0.0316   0.0778 -0.1416 -0.1998 
  nondurables      (0.23) (0.59) (1.26) (1.88)***  (0.17) (0.21) (0.49) (1.01) (2.72)*  (3.21)* 
 
Mining     0.0009  -0.0598 -0.0572 -0.0705   0.0254   0.0095 -0.0942 -0.0588 -0.1547 -0.2081 
      (0.01) (0.53) (1.79)***  (1.82)***  (0.49) (0.18) (0.99) (0.51) (2.01)**  (2.23)** 
 
Retail      0.0001  -0.0274  -0.0384  -0.0801   0.0381   0.0224   0.0182   0.0633  -0.1801  -0.2204 
(0.01)  (0.23) (1.11) (1.94)***  (0.78) (0.46) (0.26) (0.75) (3.24)*  (3.27)* 
 
Business  &  repair    -0.1410 -0.2227    -0.0277 -0.0951 -0.1562 -0.1282   0.1056   0.2947 -0.1992 -0.3455 
  services          (0.74) (1.10) (0.38) (1.10) (1.47) (1.20) (0.63) (1.52) (1.79)***  (2.61)** 
 
Educational  services    -0.2489 -0.2426 -0.0148   0.0243 -0.0632 -0.0476 -0.0468 -0.0830   0.0900   0.0923 
      (2.12)**  (1.92)***  (0.29) (0.39) (0.89) (0.66) (0.35) (0.51) (1.00) (0.84) 
 
Professional related     0.2260   0.1967  -0.0340  -0.1245   0.0621   0.0533   0.0558   0.0421  -0.2484  -0.3286 
  services        (1.49) (1.20) (0.58) (1.79)***  (0.86) (0.72) (0.39) (0.24) (2.53)**  (2.77)* 
 
Health services    -0.2955  -0.2399   0.0047   0.0624  -0.0134   0.0223   -0.0077   0.0122   0.1273   0.1582 
      (2.31)**  (1.75)***  (0.10) (1.07) (0.17) (0.30) (0.05) (0.07) (1.71)***  (1.75)*** 
 
Personal services     0.0370   0.0567  -0.0031   0.0068   0.0282   0.0218   0.0028   0.0089  -0.1249  -0.1732 
(0.35) (0.50) (0.08) (0.14) (0.32) (0.24) (0.03) (0.09) (1.83)***  (2.10)** 
 
Entertainment &      1.0238   1.1467  -0.0605  -0.1223   0.2369   0.2268   0.3201   0.7624   0.1819   0.1474 
  recreational  services    (3.05)*  (3.18)*  (0.40) (0.67) (1.36) (1.27) (1.12) (2.40)**    (1.22)  (0.81) 
 
Transportation    -0.0308 -0.0415 -0.0292 -0.0770   0.0065 -0.0142   0.0900   0.1087 -0.1160 -0.1559 
      (0.30) (0.37) (0.77) (1.70)***  (0.11) (0.24) (0.97) (0.97) (1.95)***  (2.15)** 
 
Wholesale trade     0.1385   0.1419   0.0228  -0.0855   0.0107   0.0090    -0.0617  -0.0007  -0.0583  -0.1009 
      (1.16) (1.10) (0.43) (1.38) (0.10) (0.08) (0.55) (0.01) (0.85) (1.21) 
 
Poverty     -0.0210 -0.0452 -0.0271 -0.0853   0.0302   0.0132   0.0941 -0.0132   0.0052 -0.0468 
      (0.98) (2.10)**  (2.05)**  (7.51)*  (1.16) (0.56) (1.57) (0.21) (0.28) (2.32)** 
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0068   0.0076   0.0011   0.0026   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011   0.0014   0.0021   0.0017 
      (3.77)*  (3.93)*  (1.09) (2.09)**  (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.57) (2.06)**  (1.39) 
 
R
2     0.51 0.87 0.59 0.90 0.86 0.78 0.80 0.90 0.65 0.89 
Adjusted R
2     0.54 0.78 0.41 0.86 0.65 0.48 0.55 0.80 0.47 0.83 
#  Observations    82 82 115  115  56 56 62 62 100  100 
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
                                                   
12  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.  Also, state dummies were employed in all regressions.   xiv




   _North  Dakota_  ___   Ohio  ___  _  Oklahoma__ _Pennsylvania_ _South  Carolina_ 
 
RHS Variables
13   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
Constant      -0.4522  -0.4216  -0.0094   0.1022   0.2289   0.3319  -0.0613   0.1197   0.2060    0.4611 
      (1.96)***  (1.43) (0.07) (0.86) (1.44) (2.10)**  (0.37) (0.84) (0.51) (1.35) 
 
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0279 -0.0594 -0.0136 -0.0274 -0.0248 -0.0387 -0.0176 -0.0312 -0.0118 -0.0336 
 income
14      (3.29)* (4.79)* (1.87)***  (7.68)* (3.95)* (22.11)*  (2.53)**  (9.01)* (0.62)  (5.97)* 
   
Age: 5-13 years     0.5189   0.6363   0.3202   0.3234   0.1995   0.2122   0.4895   0.4189   0.0643   0.0653 
      (1.94)***  (1.87)***  (2.03)** (2.01)** (1.02)  (1.04)  (2.61)** (2.18)** (0.19)  (0.19) 
 
Age: 14-17 years     0.4353   0.6903   0.2181   0.1811  -0.0382   0.0013   0.0179  -0.0096    0.2749    0.3078 
      (2.28)**  (3.03)*  (2.08)**  (1.72)***  (0.22) (0.01) (0.11) (0.05) (0.77) (0.85) 
 
Age: 18-64 years      0.5271   0.7409   0.1798   0.1769   0.1244   0.1254   0.2585   0.2224  -0.0292  -0.0219 
      (2.48)**  (2.83)*  (1.69)***  (1.62) (0.81) (0.78) (2.21)**  (1.85)***  (0.10) (0.07) 
 
Age: 65+       0.3343   0.4406   0.1669   0.1748   0.0601   0.0613   0.1964   0.1433   0.1607   0.0658 
      (1.89)***  (1.97)***  (1.55) (1.58) (0.46) (0.45) (1.56) (1.12) (0.57) (0.24) 
 
Blacks        0.0451   0.0828 -0.0461 -0.0345   0.0013   0.0008 -0.0172 -0.0134 -0.0112 -0.0053 
      (0.16) (0.24) (1.91)***  (1.44) (0.11) (0.07) (0.89) (0.67) (0.44) (0.21) 
 
Hispanic      -0.0493  -0.0278  -0.0123  -0.0174   0.0664   0.0807   0.0560   0.1219   0.4741   0.2112 
      (0.12) (0.05) (0.32) (0.44) (1.73)***  (2.04)**  (0.27) (0.56) (0.71) (0.33) 
 
Education: 9-11 years   -0.0456   0.0309   0.0251   0.0171  -0.0037  -0.0018   0.0001  -0.0021  -0.0157  -0.0098 
      (1.03) (0.62) (0.89) (0.60) (0.11) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.33) (0.20) 
 
Education:  H.S.  diploma  -0.0371 -0.0729 -0.0332 -0.0317   0.0409   0.0556 -0.0233 -0.0033 -0.0831 -0.1084 
      (1.13) (1.82)***  (2.01)**  (1.87)***  (1.79)***  (2.43)**  (1.13) (1.59) (1.10) (1.48) 
 
Education: Some college   0.1252   0.1838   0.1058   0.1305   0.0302   0.0728   0.0041   0.0121   0.0561   0.1236 
      (2.31)**  (2.78)**  (2.10)**  (2.62)**  (0.61) (1.54) (0.07) (0.20) (0.29) (0.66) 
 
Education: Bachelor +  -0.0453   0.1245   0.0602   0.0691   0.0251   0.0230   0.1638   0.2049  -0.0493   0.0301 
      (0.53) (1.35) (1.40) (1.58) (0.67) (0.59) (3.27)*  (4.32)*  (0.26) (0.17) 
 
Housing      -0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
      (0.07) (0.69) (1.67)***  (1.70)***  (0.86) (1.07) (1.17) (1.12) (0.93) (1.35) 
 
Federal government     0.1826   0.2289  -0.0303  -0.0232  -0.1119  -0.1022   0.0185   0.0167  -0.0208  -0.0164 
  employment    (2.02)***  (2.00)***  (0.54) (0.41) (2.22)**  (1.95)***  (0.31) (0.27) (0.26) (0.20) 
 
State government      0.1464   0.1278  -0.0195  -0.0318  -0.0514  -0.0642   0.0251   0.0252  -0.0388  -0.0734 
  employment    (2.26)**  (1.55) (0.82) (1.35) (1.52) (1.84)***  (0.99) (0.96) (0.39) (1.76)*** 
 
Local  government      0.2179   0.2417 -0.0414 -0.0202 -0.0882 -0.0902 -0.1254 -0.1365 -0.0224 -0.0184 
  employment    (2.93)*  (2.55)** (0.88)  (0.43)  (2.51)** (2.46)** (2.12)** (2.22)** (0.21)  (0.17) 
 
Self-employment     0.0702   0.0334   0.0046  -0.0148   0.0716   0.0622   0.0103   0.0325  -0.0104  -0.0169 
      (1.30) (0.49) (0.11) (0.34) (2.28)**  (1.92)***  (0.20) (0.61) (0.09) (0.15) 
 
Agriculture      0.1938   0.3063 -0.0322   0.0085 -0.1672 -0.1393 -0.0197 -0.0474 -0.1160 -0.1625 
      (1.84)***  (2.37)**  (0.39) (0.10) (2.74)*  (2.24)**  (0.24) (0.56) (0.64) (0.92) 
 
Communications     0.3453   0.4596  -0.0814  -0.0735  -0.1286  -0.1157   0.0699   0.0819   0.0621   0.1133 
      (3.03)*  (3.28)*  (0.93) (0.82) (1.96)***  (1.69)***  (0.72) (0.82) (0.23) (0.42) 
 
Construction     0.2171   0.2746  -0.0134   0.0148  -0.0694  -0.0471   0.0297   0.0198  -0.1362  -0.1448 
      (2.45)**  (2.46)**  (0.18) (0.20) (1.31) (0.86) (0.44) (0.28) (0.75) (0.79) 
 
Finance,  insurance     0.5413   0.7250 -0.0666 -0.0284 -0.1282 -0.0913 -0.0628 -0.0515 -0.0310 -0.1886 
  &  real  estate    (3.26)*  (3.57)*  (0.66) (0.28) (1.59) (1.11) (0.67) (0.53) (0.09) (0.55) 
 
Manufacturing  –        0.3316   0.4189 -0.0457 -0.0261 -0.0951 -0.0836 -0.0016 -0.0092 -0.0899 -0.1359 
  durables      (3.57)*  (3.65)*  (0.69) (0.39) (1.82)***  (1.54) (0.03) (0.15) (0.53) (0.82) 
                                                   
13  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   
14  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.     xv
 
 





   _North  Dakota_  ___   Ohio  ___  _  Oklahoma__ _Pennsylvania_ _South  Carolina_ 
 
RHS Variables
15   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
 
Manufacturing  –          0.4186   0.5928 -0.0538 -0.0341 -0.1051 -0.0902   0.0011 -0.0118 -0.1061 -0.1642 
  nondurables      (3.03)*  (3.57)*  (0.86) (0.54) (2.13)**  (1.77)***  (0.02) (0.20) (0.62) (1.00) 
 
Mining       0.2029   0.3108 -0.0693 -0.0474 -0.1035 -0.0794   0.0275   0.0133 -0.1625 -0.2692 
      (2.00)***  (2.50)**  (1.03) (0.70) (1.86)***  (1.39) (0.42) (0.19) (0.33) (0.55) 
  
Retail        0.2733   0.3688 -0.0727 -0.0475 -0.1534 -0.1521 -0.0387 -0.0528 -0.0314 -0.0868 
      (2.73)**  (2.98)*  (1.05) (0.69) (2.66)**  (2.52)**  (0.62) (0.82) (0.17) (0.47) 
 
Business  &  repair      0.2177   0.1469 -0.1216 -0.0871 -0.1544 -0.1851 -0.0039 -0.0182   0.3402   0.2742 
  services          (1.59) (0.85) (0.94) (0.67) (1.42) (1.65) (0.03) (0.15) (0.82) (0.66) 
 
Educational services     0.0470   0.0900   0.0362   0.0345   0.1086    0.0991  -0.1538  -0.1111   0.1611   0.1143 
      (0.40) (0.60) (0.38) (0.35) (1.42) (1.24) (1.22) (0.86) (0.45) (0.32) 
 
Professional  related      0.0462 -0.0381 -0.0705 -0.0583 -0.1505 -0.1237   0.0284 -0.0526 -0.1690 -0.2403 
  services        (0.37) (0.24) (0.69) (0.56) (1.85)***  (1.48) (0.18) (0.33) (0.48) (0.68) 
 
Health services     0.1797   0.3786   0.0055   0.0115   0.0751   0.0833  -0.0043   0.0623  -0.0615  -0.0945 
      (1.32) (2.36)**  (0.06) (0.12) (1.06) (1.13) (0.03) (0.49) (0.14) (0.22) 
 
Personal services     0.3575   0.4887   0.1178   0.1560  -0.1594  -0.1709  -0.0788  -0.0864  -0.0612  -0.1066 
(2.76)**  (3.07)*  (1.28) (1.69)***  (2.09)**  (2.15)**  (0.88) (0.93) (0.29) (0.50) 
 
Entertainment &      0.5566   0.7627   0.2041   0.2109  -0.2447  -0.2212   0.3019   0.3957  -0.2259  -0.2122 
  recreational  services    (3.00)*  (3.37)*  (0.97) (0.98) (1.17) (1.01) (0.88) (1.12) (0.49) (0.45) 
  
Transportation      0.2914   0.3771 -0.0695 -0.0479 -0.0831 -0.0808   0.0452   0.0288 -0.1319 -0.2140 
      (2.59)**  (2.67)**  (0.96) (0.66) (1.11) (1.03) (0.67) (0.41) (0.61) (1.04) 
   
Wholesale trade     0.1758   0.2107   0.0445   0.0580  -0.0351  -0.0143  -0.0249  -0.0055  -0.2581  -0.3619 
      (1.58) (1.49) (0.52) (0.67) (0.39) (0.15) (0.27) (0.06) (0.87) (1.27) 
 
Poverty     -0.0083   0.0011 -0.0220 -0.0578   0.0075 -0.0122   0.0010 -0.0280 -0.0487 -0.0903 
      (0.26) (0.03) (0.77) (2.65)**  (0.38) (0.67) (0.03) (0.83) (0.75) (1.66) 
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0000    0.0000   0.0012   0.0015  -0.0012  -0.0009  -0.0000  -0.0001   0.0002   0.4611 
      (0.00) (0.00) (1.18) (1.46) (0.90) (0.63) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (1.35) 
 
R
2     0.90 0.91 0.74 0.89 0.78 0.89 67  67  46  46 
Adjusted R
2     0.73 0.78 0.57 0.83 0.61 0.81 0.81 0.93 072  0.92 
#  Observations    53 53 88 88 77 77 0.61  0.86  0.70  0.73 
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
                                                   
15  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   xvi




   _South  Dakota_   __Tennessee__  _____Texas  __ ___  Virginia_  _ __Washington__ 
 
RHS Variables
16   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
Constant      -0.0361   0.0112   0.0310   0.1737   0.2637   0.3720    0.0922   0.3519   0.0743   0.0594 
      (0.23) (0.08) (0.24) (1.31) (4.04)*  (5.60)*  (0.85) (3.12)*  (0.11) (0.10) 
 
Log  1970  per  capita      -0.0193 -0.0265 -0.0199   -0.0391  -0.0211 -0.0356 -0.0045 -0.0348 -0.0349 -0.0327 
 income
17      (2.39)**  (4.77)* (3.55)* (15.21)*  (8.10)* (15.18) (0.69)  (15.81)*  (1.09)  (9.29)* 
   
Age: 5-13 years     0.4792   0.5227   0.1158    0.1347  -0.0577  -0.0224   0.0098   0.0688   0.4242   0.4183 
      (2.62)**  (2.98)*  (0.80) (0.86) (0.88) (0.32) (0.08) (0.49) (0.42) (0.47) 
 
Age: 14-17 years     0.2482   0.2632   0.0766   0.1122  -0.0136  -0.0134  -0.0104   0.0346   0.2212    0.2310 
      (1.67) (1.79)***  (0.63) (0.86) (0.22) (0.21) (0.10) (0.27) (0.29) (0.34) 
 
Age: 18-64 years      0.2601    0.2906   0.0391   0.0795  -0.0209  -0.0245  -0.0315  -0.0257   0.3787   0.3784 
      (1.72)***  (1.98)***  (0.34) (0.63) (0.40) (0.44) (0.33) (0.23) (0.48) (0.53) 
  
Age: 65+       0.3072   0.3334   0.1121   0.1437  -0.0408  -0.0672  -0.0139   0.0026   0.3521   0.3390 
      (2.59)**  (2.91)*  (1.07) (1.27) (0.93) (1.44) (0.17) (0.03) (0.44) (0.49) 
 
Blacks      -0.1415   -0.1344   0.0125   0.0137   0.0006  -0.0038  -0.0005   0.0012  -0.0935  -0.0984 
      (0.61) (0.58) (1.28) (1.30) (0.09) (0.51) (0.08) (0.16) (0.42) (0.53) 
 
Hispanic      -0.0963  -0.1177   0.6294   0.6146  -0.0106  -0.0174   0.0615   0.0112   0.0907   0.0886 
      (0.61) (0.76) (2.29)**  (2.06)**  (1.72)***  (2.71)*  (0.30) (0.05) (0.77) (0.88) 
 
Education: 9-11 years   -0.0949  -0.0903  -0.0098   0.0093  -0.0497  -0.0594   0.0141   0.0128   0.0354   0.0307 
      (2.66)**  (2.57)**  (0.36) (0.33) (4.28)*  (4.85)*  (0.64) (0.48) (0.20) (0.21) 
 
Education: H.S. diploma   0.0127   0.0181   0.0063   0.0077   0.0102   0.0061   0.0024   0.0157   0.0203   0.0146 
      (0.54) (0.80) (0.24) (0.26) (0.80) (0.45) (0.10) (0.54) (0.13) (0.12) 
 
Education: Some college   0.0305   0.0352  -0.0626  -0.0673   0.0292   0.0282  -0.0136  -0.0211   0.0247   0.0199 
      (0.62) (0.72) (1.11) (1.10) (1.41) (1.28) (0.21) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) 
  
Education: Bachelor +  -0.0904  -0.0811   0.1161   0.1732  -0.0396  -0.0175   0.0283   0.0961   0.1527   0.1531 
      (1.52) (1.39) (2.11)**  (3.04)*  (1.67)***  (0.70) (0.57) (1.68)*  (0.85) (0.95) 
 
Housing       0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
      (0.10) (0.15) (1.05) (0.63) (1.09) (0.70) (1.69)***  (0.93) (0.90) (1.26) 
 
Federal  government    -0.0341 -0.0488 -0.0013 -0.0032 -0.0497 -0.0307 -0.0255 -0.0166 -0.0259 -0.0268 
  employment    (0.69) (1.05) (0.04) (0.10) (1.65) (0.96) (0.76) (0.42) (0.35) (0.42) 
 
State  government        0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0323 -0.0615   0.0058 -0.0021   0.0115 -0.0122 -0.0701 -0.0691 
  employment    (0.19) (0.04) (1.01) (1.83)***  (0.34) (0.11) (0.33) (0.29) (0.51) (0.57) 
 
Local government    -0.0441  -0.0544   0.0056   0.0067  -0.0277  -0.0306   0.0458   0.0234  -0.1603  -0.1572 
  employment    (0.96) (1.23) (0.17) (0.19) (1.30) (1.35) (1.04) (0.44) (0.62) (0.69) 
 
Self-employment     0.0433   0.0372   0.0246    0.0126  -0.0102  -0.0009   0.0146  -0.0126   0.0021   0.0015 
      (1.59) (1.42) (0.72) (0.34) (0.78) (0.07) (0.44) (0.32) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Agriculture    -0.1012  -0.1072   0.0707   0.0930   0.0006   0.0329   0.0018   0.0051  -0.0914  -0.0938 
      (1.56) (1.67) (1.09) (1.33) (0.02) (0.92) (0.03) (0.08) (0.70) (0.83) 
 
Communications    -0.2021 -0.1912   0.0479   0.0729 -0.1123 -0.0893 -0.0719 -0.0744   0.0475   0.0490 
      (1.57) (1.49) (0.82) (1.15) (2.47)**  (1.85)***  (0.97) (0.84) (0.31) (0.36) 
 
Construction    -0.0505   -0.0561   0.1412   0.1380   0.0164   0.0471   0.0307   0.0389   0.0244   0.0205 
      (0.57) (0.64) (2.31)**  (2.08)**  (0.44) (1.21) (0.68) (0.72) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
Finance, insurance     0.0807    0.0785   0.2709   0.2628   0.1241   0.1834   0.0282   0.1706  -0.0384  -0.0328 
  &  real  estate    (0.74) (0.72) (2.56)**  (2.29)**  (2.31)**  (3.27)*  (0.27) (1.39) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
Manufacturing –      0.0102   0.0046   0.1112   0.1060   0.0075   0.0324  -0.0236  -0.0306  -0.0803  -0.0801 
  durables      (0.14) (0.07) (1.93)***  (1.69)***  (0.22) (0.91) (0.59) (0.64) (0.54) (0.60) 
                                                   
16  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   
17  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.             xvii
 
 





   _South  Dakota_   __Tennessee__  _____Texas  __ ___  Virginia_  _ __Washington__ 
 
RHS Variables
18   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
 
 
Manufacturing  –        -0.0821 -0.1054   0.0941   0.0870 -0.0229 -0.0011 -0.0313 -0.0319 -0.0937 -0.0969 
  nondurables      (0.85) (1.13) (1.62) (1.38) (0.68) (0.03) (0.76) (0.65) (0.52) (0.62) 
 
Mining     -0.0544 -0.0683   0.0565   0.0521 -0.0205   0.0066 -0.0216 -0.0173   0.0229   0.0249 
      (0.79) (1.02) (0.91) (0.78) (0.60) (0.18) (0.49) (0.32) (0.18) (0.23) 
 
Retail      -0.0504 -0.0630   0.1449   0.1581 -0.0374 -0.0161 -0.0855 -0.0893 -0.1136 -0.1112 
      (0.65) (0.83) (2.12)**  (2.14)**  (1.04) (0.42) (1.84)***  (1.59) (0.61) (0.68) 
 
Business & repair     0.1221   0.1090   0.0947   0.0977   0.0530   0.1079   0.0165  -0.0314  -0.0946  -0.0943 
  services          (1.01) (0.92) (1.55) (1.47) (0.94) (1.83)***  (0.13) (0.21) (0.42) (0.47) 
 
Educational services     0.0649   0.0651   0.1237   0.0989   0.0061  -0.0347  -0.1828  -0.1852   0.2693   0.2860 
      (0.86) (0.86) (1.34) (0.99) (0.15) (0.80) (2.05)**  (1.73)***  (0.72) (1.16) 
 
Professional related    -0.0298  -0.0434   0.0067   0.0126  -0.0363   0.0179   0.1071   0.0931  -0.3770  -0.3947 
  services        (0.29) (0.44) (0.07) (0.12) (0.72) (0.34) (1.29) (0.93) (0.88) (1.31) 
 
Health services     0.0056   0.0115   0.1044   0.0787   0.0443   0.0364  -0.1005  -0.0846   0.4003   0.4279 
      (0.29) (0.16) (1.37) (0.96) (1.05) (0.81) (1.15) (0.80) (0.76) (1.49) 
 
Personal services     0.0059  -0.0206   0.0624    0.0495   0.0388   0.0919   0.0147   0.0233  -0.2745  -0.2739 
(0.08) (0.23) (0.78) (0.57) (0.98) (2.25)**  (0.35) (0.46) (1.25) (1.39) 
 
Entertainment  &      -0.0856 -0.1032 -0.4711 -0.3789   0.0251   0.0295 -0.0453   0.0022 -0.0226 -0.0475 
  recreational  services    (0.46) (0.56) (1.62) (1.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.19) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) 
 
Transportation      0.0505   0.0448   0.1087   0.0979 -0.0474 -0.0107 -0.0214 -0.0325 -0.0049 -0.0022 
      (0.45) (0.40) (1.53) (1.27) (1.20) (0.26) (0.39) (0.49) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Wholesale trade    -0.1189   -0.1473   0.1988   0.2004   0.0111   0.0238   0.0512   0.0139  -0.2369  -0.2399 
      (1.06) (1.38) (2.17)**  (2.02)**  (0.26) (0.52) (0.81) (0.18) (0.74) (0.85) 
 
Poverty     -0.0414 -0.0448 -0.0257 -0.0492 -0.0312 -0.0525 -0.0194 -0.0465 -0.0383 -0.0318 
      (1.67) (1.84)***  (1.55) (2.99)*  (2.80)*  (4.70)*  (1.06) (2.21)**  (0.29) (0.41) 
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0052   0.0050   0.0035   0.0038   0.0012   0.0017   0.0010  -0.0000   0.0019   0.0018 
      (1.63) (1.57) (2.93)*  (2.95)*  (1.51) (1.95)**  (0.43) (0.01) (0.66) (0.80) 
 
R
2     0.83  0.87  97 97 254  254  84 84 39 39 
Adjusted R
2     0.65 0.74 0.68 0.88 0.53 0.71 0.62 0.83 0.96 0.96 
#  Observations    66  66  0.51 0.82 0.46 0.66 0.34 0.72 0.66 0.76 
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
                                                   
18  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   xviii




   _ W e s t   V i r g i n i a _   __Wisconsin__  
 
RHS Variables
19   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS    
 
Constant      -0.0132   0.1587   0.2621   0.3286 
   (0.07)  (0.65)  (1.99)***  (3.28)* 
 
Log 1970 per capita      0.0043  -0.0336  -0.0191  -0.0240 
 income
20    (0.43)  (15.49)*  (3.08)*  (6.83)* 
   
Age: 5-13 years     0.0763   0.0178  -0.1476  -0.1801 
   (0.29)  (0.05)  (1.09)  (1.40) 
 
Age: 14-17 years     0.1165   0.0999  -0.0529  -0.1002 
   (0.71)  (0.48)  (0.37)  (078) 
 
Age: 18-64 years      0.0115   0.0185  -0.1169  -0.1455 
   (0.07)  (0.09)  (1.12)  (1.50) 
 
Age:  65+      0.0152  -0.0558  -0.1883  -0.2164 
   (0.09)  (0.25)  (1.86)***  (2.30)** 
 
Blacks      -0.0391 -0.0428 -0.0286 -0.0274 
   (1.46)  (1.26)  (0.41)  (0.39) 
 
Hispanic      0.0315  -0.1564  -0.0318  -0.0232 
   (0.10)  (0.39)  (0.27)  (0.20) 
 
Education: 9-11 years    0.0072   0.0470  -0.0313  -0.0273 
   (0.15)  (0.81)  (1.07)  (0.95) 
 
Education:  H.S.  diploma  -0.0774 -0.0223 -0.0311 -0.0268 
   (2.04)***  (0.50)  (1.78)***  (1.62) 
 
Education: Some college   0.0197  -0.0134   0.0129   0.0229 
   (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.37)  (0.71) 
 
Education: Bachelor +  -0.0005   0.1089   0.0767   0.0923 
   (0.01)  (0.98)  (1.86)***  (2.57)** 
 
Housing      0.0000    0.0000    -0.0000  -0.0000 
   (0.14)  (1.28)  (0.46)  (0.35) 
 
Federal government     0.0606    0.0862   0.0121   0.0147 
  employment    (1.06) (1.20) (0.36) (0.45) 
 
State government      0.0128   0.0147  -0.0238  -0.0208 
  employment    (0.46) (0.41) (0.76) (0.68) 
 
Local government    -0.0773  -0.0250   0.0438   0.0459 
  employment    (1.18) (0.31) (1.26) (1.33) 
 
Self-employment     0.0245  -0.0084   0.0004   0.0022 
   (0.36)  (0.10)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
 
Agriculture    -0.0106   0.1886   0.0321   0.0401 
   (0.09)  (1.38)  (0.55)  (0.70) 
 
Communications     0.0269   0.1785   0.1230   0.1164 
   (0.25)  (1.41)  (1.21)  (1.15) 
 
Construction    -0.0309   0.1389   0.0912   0.0912 
   (0.32)  (1.26)  (1.62)  (1.63) 
 
Finance, insurance     0.0515   0.1316   0.0395   0.0355 
 & real estate    (0.41)  (0.85)  (0.51)  (0.47) 
 
Manufacturing –     -0.0374   0.1254   0.0570   0.0614 
  durables      (0.38) (1.13) (1.00) (1.09) 
                                                   
19  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970.   
20  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.     xix
 
 





   _ W e s t   V i r g i n i a _   __Wisconsin__  
 
RHS Variables
21   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS    
 
 
Manufacturing –      -0.0258   0.1439   0.0508   0.0551 
  nondurables      (0.25) (1.22) (0.89) (0.97) 
 
Mining      -0.0608   0.1140   0.0795   0.0778 
   (0.59)  (0.98)  (1.10)  (1.08) 
 
Retail       0.0388   0.2805   0.0552   0.0687 
   (0.29)  (1.86)***  (0.82)  (1.06) 
 
Business & repair     0.1994   0.0557   0.2319   0.2284 
 services        (1.47)  (0.34)  (1.90)***  (1.88)*** 
 
Educational services     0.0516  -0.0645  -0.0483  -0.0511 
   (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.54)  (0.58) 
 
Professional related    -0.0726   0.1359   0.0613   0.0551 
  services        (0.50) (0.80) (0.74) (0.67) 
 
Health services     0.0212  -0.0128   0.0144   0.0192 
   (0.19)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.24) 
 
Personal services    -0.0188   0.1509   0.0537   0.0493 
(0.17) (1.15) (0.65) (0.60) 
 
Entertainment &      0.0342   0.2851   0.0225   0.0324 
  recreational  services    (0.21) (1.50) (0.10) (0.15) 
 
Transportation    -0.0506   0.0948   0.0207   0.0249 
   (0.46)  (0.73)  (0.31)  (0.38) 
 
Wholesale trade    -0.1665   0.0401   0.0865   0.0922 
   (1.14)  (0.23)  (1.31)  (1.41) 
 
Poverty     -0.0182 -0.0417 -0.0129 -0.0241 
   (0.77)  (1.44)  (0.45)  (0.97) 
 
Metro area, 1970     0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0001 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.13) 
 
R
2     0.80 0.87 0.74 0.89 
Adjusted R
2     0.50 0.68 0.50 0.79 
#  Observations    55 55 70 70  
 
 
*    significant at 1% level 
**   significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 10% level 
 
 
                                                   
21  All RHS variables are initial values from 1970. Bar-Ilan University 
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